Public safety, individual liberty, and suspect science: future dangerousness assessments and sex offender laws by Hamilton, Melissa
19 of 26 DOCUMENTS
Copyright (c) 2011 Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher
Education
Temple Law Review
Spring, 2011
83 Temp. L. Rev. 697
LENGTH: 33617 words
ARTICLE: PUBLIC SAFETY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, AND SUSPECT SCIENCE: FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
ASSESSMENTS AND SEX OFFENDER LAWS
NAME: Melissa Hamilton*
BIO: * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., The University of Texas
at Austin School of Law; Ph.D, Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin.
LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:
... Part V offers a review of case law involving the role of the two actuarial assessment tools in SVP status cases,
including an assessment of how courts have responded to Daubert-and Frye-based challenges to the instruments. ...
Hence, with the Supreme Court's approval of expert predictions of future violence in death penalty cases, and with the
majority's reference to expert assessments of the risk of violence in civil commitments, it seems reasonable to
extrapolate Barefoot's general conclusion to future dangerousness assessments of sex offenders. ... To develop the
experience table, the developer used the sexual recidivism rates observed in seven follow-up studies of released sex
offenders in the United States, Canada, and England. ... The STATIC-99 instrument includes 10 static factors : Age at
assessment: Number of prior sentencing 0 = 25 years or older dates: 1 = between 18 and 25 years 0 = 3 or less 1 = 4 or
more Having lived with an age-appropriate Any convictions for a non- intimate partner for at least 2 years: contact
sexual offense: 0 = yes; 1 = no 0 = no; 1 = yes Any convictions for an Index non-sexual Any nonfamilial victims:
violent offense: 0 = no; 1 = yes 1 = yes; 0 = no Any convictions for non-sexual violence Any stranger victims: before
the Index (most recent sexual 0= no; 1 = yes offense) offense: 1 = yes; 0 = no Number of prior sex offenses: Any male
victims: 0 = none 0 = no; 1 = yes 1 = 1-2 charges or 1 conviction 2 = 3-5 charges or 2-3 convictions 3 = > 6 charges or
> 4 convictions For STATIC-99, total scores range from 0 to 12, arranged within seven risk categories organized into
four ordinal risk groups (from 0 = low risk to 6+ = high risk). ... It is highly questionable whether there ever was - and
even more questionable whether there is today - a general acceptance in the mental health field about the validity of
using actuarial risk assessments in SVP legal determinations. ... Judicial Perspectives on Future Dangerousness
Evidence Since the Supreme Court approved mental health testimony about future dangerousness and found civil
commitment of sexual predators and registration laws to be constitutional, the introduction of actuarial risk assessments
through expert testimony has become common practice in SVP determinations. ... In the case, the prosecutor had
argued that even low scores from actuarial tools are sufficient to constitute the legal standard of "likely" to reoffend:
Even taking the expert's tests, the RRASOR, about 11% failure rate after ten years. ... And, finally, some argue that the
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legislatures created sexual predator laws with the future dangerousness concept and, thus, we (mental health experts,
judges, and lawyers) need to use the best available evidence to make those decision - even if the legal standards remain
vague, and even though current models of actuarial risk assessment suffer large gaps in validity and reliability.
TEXT:
[*698]
I. Introduction
Arguably one of the most prolonged and contentious debates in legal history centers on the balance between protecting
basic civil liberties as guaranteed by the Constitution and protecting the public from harm. Certainly the shadow of
terrorist threats after the 9/11 attacks reignited this debate and has fueled public interest in changing the balance
between security and liberty in favor of introducing a more preventive state. n1 While tipping the scale in favor of using
a preventive law model might initially serve to calm public fear, be it about terrorism or crime generally, such actions
may ultimately reduce the freedoms of many citizens in the long-term. n2 This is particularly true in the highly
emotional area of predatory sex crimes. n3
In recent decades, federal, state, and local governments have become increasingly restrictive on the freedom and
privacy of those labeled sexually violent predators (SVPs) for the purpose of preventing further sexual violence. The
most commonly used tools to manage SVPs are involuntary commitments for mental treatment, sex offender
registration, and residency restrictions (hereinafter "SVP laws"). n4 In an effort to streamline the identification of sex
offenders who pose a future danger and thereby might be subject to SVP laws, officials place substantive legal emphasis
on psychosexual evaluations by individuals accepted as experts. n5 These experts are generally mental health
practitioners who offer opinion evidence about an individual's likelihood of sexually reoffending, often using actuarial
(statistical calculation of risk) assessments. While protecting the public from the damage that sexual violence causes is
clearly an important goal, this Article critically analyzes whether future dangerousness assessments using actuarial tools
are responsive to legal standards contained in SVP laws and whether courts, when confronted with such assessments,
are adequately engaging in the gatekeeper role to accept only "good science" n6 as per the [*699] evidentiary
benchmarks of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n7 and Frye v. United States. n8
In Part II, the dominant SVP laws are outlined and a discussion follows about how and why politicians and the
public are enamored with the assumed need for these specialized laws. Statistical evidence is then provided that
challenges whether public fears about SVPs are realistic and whether SVP laws serve their preventive goals.
Part III provides a brief review of the current law on the admissibility criteria for expert evidence, with the
concomitant summary of Daubert-and Frye-based standards. Additionally, the role of mental health practitioners in
providing expert evidence in court when future dangerousness is at issue is discussed.
Part IV summarizes two of the most common actuarial risk assessment tools used to identify and label sex
offenders who will be subject to SVP laws. An explanatory analysis is then provided of the empirical validity of
actuarial tools in predicting sexual offense recidivism. Assessing whether actuarial-based risk prediction is good science
is of extreme importance today. Not only is the implementation of SVP laws growing costlier and more intrusive in
scope, new evidence has emerged to significantly undermine the validity of applying these actuarial tests to U.S.
offenders.
Part V offers a review of case law involving the role of the two actuarial assessment tools in SVP status cases,
including an assessment of how courts have responded to Daubert-and Frye-based challenges to the instruments.
Considering that the vast majority of courts decline such challenges, this Part explores how the actuarial assessments
instrumentally impact legal decisions on future dangerousness. In addition, Part V analyzes evidence indicating that
instances of experts engaging in adversarial bias and presenting empirically incorrect representations of actuarial
predictions are all too common.
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Finally, the Conclusion offers cautionary notes and suggestions for reevaluating SVP laws and actuarial
assessments of future dangerousness. Specifically, this Article concludes that because of uncritical reliance upon
actuarial assessments of future dangerousness, legal professionals have largely failed to grasp the significant empirical
and practical limitations of these tests.
Judges and lawyers participating in SVP cases must appreciate the serious challenges to the reliability and validity
of actuarial assessments being presented as expert evidence. The potential that criminal justice practitioners use
empirically questionable assessments to inform decisions on the SVP status of individual defendants poses significant
negative impacts upon the public and upon defendants. n9 SVP laws are very expensive and resource intensive for
governmental institutions to implement, maintain, and enforce. n10 Defendants also suffer a considerable infringement
[*700] of their constitutionally-protected interests in liberty and privacy through measures (i.e., incarceration, public
registration, and residency restrictions) which can render them labeled as sexually violent predators. Hence, if
pseudoscience greatly impacts these decisions, the significant risk of false positives (giving a sexual predator label to a
defendant not likely to reoffend) and false negatives (not giving a sexual predator status to a defendant highly likely to
reoffend) undermines the preventive goals of SVP laws while rendering significant costs to the public and to individual
defendants.
II. Special Treatment for Sex Offenders
If sex sells, and if violence sells, their combination is exponentially alluring, n11 and provides sensational headlines
that suggest the United States is in the midst of a sex crimes wave. n12 Largely due to the media fomenting moral panic
about dangerous sex offenders, n13 the management of sex offenders is a top priority for legislative action today. n14
The connection between the media and legislative efforts to invoke preventive measures on SVPs is clear, as the
pressure to increase control and punishment of SVPs often comes from citizens after heinous sex acts become high
profile cases in the news. n15 However, the media's method of coverage has also magnified exceptional [*701] cases
of sexual violence and incorrectly implied that sex crimes are mostly accomplished by fearsome strangers. n16 Through
repeated publication of their names and photographs, telegenic victims of sex crimes, particularly those young and cute,
literally become the "poster children" for the moral panic and public demands for officials to do something to protect
potential future victims. n17 Likewise, the media has also hyped stories involving repeat sex offenders thereby leading
to the iconic image of the recidivist sexual predator, i.e., the SVP.
Researchers have studied the cyclical nature of the moral panic to help explain its endurance. In one study,
surveyed legislators admitted that their opinions on the need for restrictive measures for SVPs were informed greatly by
media reports and constituent concerns. n18 A terse comment by a legislator is telling: "You hear about these guys
raping and killing kids all the time now. We have to do something. It's gotta stop." n19 In turn, with new SVP
legislation, the media responds with further coverage reporting the government's admission about the particular dangers
imposed by the presence of SVPs in communities, thereby continuing the cycle and reinforcing the image of the
menacing sexual predator. This rhetoric underlying the moral panic continues, despite contradictory evidence. Official
statistics show that in the United States, rates of rape/sexual assault declined by approximately fifty-three percent
between 1999 and 2008. n20 Similarly, the rate of child sexual abuse in the United States dropped by an estimated
fifty-eight percent from 1992 to 2008. n21 Further, sex offenders are not more likely than other types of [*702]
offenders to either recidivate generally or to specialize in committing sex offenses. n22
So, in light of legislative convergence upon new types of preventive measures as applying only to sex offenders,
one might reasonably consider: Why the special treatment? Many suggest that citizens view sexual deviance as
qualitatively unique. While most offense-based laws regulate risky behavior, SVP laws focus on regulating risky
persons, as if the sexual violence makes the sexual offender himself a unique characteristic. n23 Citizens commonly
believe that sexual offenders are most likely to be strangers to the victim and more likely to reoffend than other types of
criminals. n24 Experts indicate that the public tends to believe that sexualized violence has actually become more
pervasive in recent years and that it is causing greater harm to society. n25 This is particularly true with the proliferation
of technology as media portrayals fuel largely mythical fears regarding SVPs using the internet to lure victims. n26
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As a result, legislators have articulated a number of responses to deter sexual violence through criminal laws, such
as creating new criminal offenses and imposing longer sentences for sexual offenses, as well as other measures aimed at
managing the sexual offender population. n27 In large part, complicity between public fear, media hype, [*703] and
political pandering works efficiently because of the imbalance in the debate. Families of murdered victims of sex crimes
act as informal lobbyists for increasing control of sex offenders in what is a uniquely bipartisan political environment on
the issue. There is virtually no counter movement to represent the interests of those alleged to be SVPs, who are largely
reviled by all. n28 Often, the legislative drive in imposing new preventive measures on SVPs is espoused in assertions
about the prevalence and danger of sex offenders, often without any empirical support. n29
Because of the widespread fear of SVPs, concerns have focused on the likelihood of sexual recidivism after
convicted sex offenders are released from imprisonment. The management of those convicted of sex-based crimes after
release has been largely effectuated through the enforcement of civil (rather than criminal) laws. The use of civil
regulations as management tools has the distinct benefit of permitting criminal justice officials to restrict the freedom
and privacy of sex offenders without abiding by the stricter procedural requirements that would be constitutionally
required in the criminal law arena. The civil law-based tools also permit state officials to monitor and supervise sex
offenders beyond traditional parole and probation structures. The most common types of civil laws used today to
manage the sex offender population are SVP civil commitment laws, registration requirements, and residency
restrictions. n30
A. SVP Laws
1. Civil Commitment Laws
SVP civil commitment statutes are a distinct species of traditional civil commitment laws that permit a state to commit
a person to a mental institution who is mentally ill and who poses a danger to others. The Kansas SVP law is typical. It
[*704] defines an SVP as a person who meets three main criteria: 1) the person has been convicted or charged with a
sexually violent offense, and 2) the person "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder" which 3) "makes
the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence" if not confined in a secure facility. n31 A person adjudged
to be an SVP under this law is then committed for an indefinite period in a secure institution, despite not having
committed a new offense. In a ground-breaking decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Kansas v. Hendricks
n32 upheld the Kansas SVP law in the face of constitutional challenges. n33 The Court dismissed Hendricks' claims that
the law violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. n34 The starting point for the analysis was that the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to laws that are intended as punishment. n35 The majority ruled
that civil commitment is civil in nature and since it is not intended for deterrent or retributive purposes, it does not
constitute punishment. n36
Post-Hendricks, most SVP civil commitment statutes have been modeled after the Kansas statute. n37 Being civil
in nature, defendants in civil commitment proceedings do not enjoy many of the benefits of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, such as freedom from self-incrimination, jury trial, or confrontation of witnesses, but are generally
provided some right to counsel. n38
In practice, most states use SVP civil commitment laws when a sex offender is about to be released from prison.
The idea is to allow the offenders to serve their sentences under normal custodial arrangements but then to transfer them
to other secure accommodations just before their scheduled release dates so that the offenders are actually never freed.
Currently, twenty states and the federal government have implemented SVP civil commitment laws, and a recent
estimate is that over 4,500 SVPs are held in civil commitment facilities under these laws. n39 Once committed, it is
very difficult for defendants to ever be released. n40
[*705]
2. Registration Requirements
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Sex offender registration systems are public information devices. All fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have mandated sex offender registries. n41 Much of the information is widely available to the public on freely
accessible internet sites. The type of information that sex offenders are required to provide has expanded dramatically
over the years. As an example, Georgia requires the registrant's name, date of birth, height, weight, fingerprints, photo,
residence, employment information, and vehicle details. n42 After initial registration, sex offenders are generally
required to update the information from time to time. n43 Once a person is labeled an SVP for registration purposes, it
may be quite difficult to challenge the designation, even on grounds that the label was erroneously imposed. n44
3. Residency Restrictions
States and local jurisdictions are also active in passing laws banning sex offenders from residing in ever larger swaths
of areas. Unlike the other two SVP schemes that tend to be federal or statewide in scope, residency restrictions are more
likely to be enacted at the local level by town or city councils. n45 The resulting multiplicity of regulations has resulted
in a wide variety of restrictions that apply to different types of offenders. Some laws apply to all sex offenders n46
while others target just violent sex offenders or those who have committed sexual crimes against children. n47 In some
states, residency restrictions apply even to offenders convicted of non-contact sex-based offenses, such as possession of
pornography. n48 A common criterion is to delineate a certain area where the sex offender is not permitted to reside,
such as 1,000 or 2,000 feet around specified locations like schools, parks, and bus stops. n49 These policies have
resulted in effectively banning sex offenders from residing in whole [*706] towns, cities, and counties. n50 Further,
lifetime residency restrictions are now common. n51
A few items of note apply generally to both registration and residency laws. While many states require registration
per se after a conviction for one of many enumerated sex offenses, about half of the state laws utilize a future
dangerousness assessment model n52 to individually tailor the exact nature of the registration requirements. n53
Similarly, while many residency restrictions apply per se to those convicted of specified sex offenses, many of the laws
correspond to the registration system by invoking residency restrictions on registered sex offenders. A violation of these
laws most often constitutes a new criminal offense and a new prison sentence as a consequence. n54 Registration
requirements and residency restrictions have often been applied retroactively, meaning applying to offenders convicted
prior to the laws' enactment. n55 Facing claims that the laws violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled that registration is civil in nature and, thus, the clause is inapplicable. n56 While the question of the
constitutionality of residency restrictions has [*707] not risen to the highest level, lower courts have generally denied
such claims on the same basis. n57
Critics, meanwhile, continue to decry that SVP laws are punitive in nature since they serve the legislative and
public thirst for retribution against sex offenders n58 and are highly restrictive measures used in addition to prison
sentences. Moreover, future dangerousness assessments - which have "begun to colonize our theories of punishment"
n59 - signify a broader policy shift toward incapacitation as the key method for preventing crime, a trend which reflects
that we have given up on trying to reduce crime by investing in job opportunities, education, assistance to immigrants,
drug rehabilitation programs, reentry programs, and the like... . In order to become evermore efficient, we develop
actuarial methods to determine who should be exiled to prison and for how long. n60
B.
(Un)Intended Consequences of Sexual Predator Laws
In conceptualizing how well SVP laws fit the preventive law model, two key issues emerge. One is whether the hype
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about the dangerous sexual predator is accurate. The second is whether these restrictions do more harm than good to
those to whom they are applied and to the public welfare in general. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully
explore these issues, it seems relevant to at least mention them here in order to highlight why the potential misuse of
actuarial risk tools in SVP litigation is problematic to the notions of law and justice.
1. Sexual Predators and Stranger Danger: Is the Concern Valid?
Much empirical evidence indicates that the iconic image of the SVP is more mythical than real. A natural starting point
is the relatively simplistic statistic of the base rate. The base rate for recidivism essentially means the overall rate of
recidivism actually observed in a group of offenders. n61 Before reviewing results from official [*708] studies, it is
important to consider that base rates can vary by study. Three important methodological choices between studies can
help explain the variation: the defining characteristic of recidivism (the operationalization of the outcome variable); the
time period for observation; and the demographic characteristics of the group observed. For example, if the outcome
variable is arrest then the base rate will naturally be higher than if the outcome requires a conviction. The longer period
of time for follow-up will yield higher numbers since there is more opportunity to reoffend. Another consideration is
that a group that is at higher risk of recidivism (e.g., younger offenders), who reoffend more often than older offenders,
will yield a higher base rate because of the attribute (e.g., youth) that is correlated with higher risk.
In a prominent base-rate study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, researchers conducted a three-year
follow-up of over 9,600 male sex offenders released in 1994. n62 They found that 5.3% of the released offenders had
been rearrested for a sex crime within three years of their release. n63 This rate was much higher than the 1.3% rearrest
statistic on sexual offenses for the non-sex offenders who were released the same year. n64 However, comparing the
groups committing new non-sex offenses, non-sex offenders had a 68% rearrest rate overall, compared to the 43%
rearrest rate for sexual offenders. n65 Another study of male offenders released from prisons in Massachusetts in 2002
also compared recidivism rates (there defined as any reincarceration or parole violation) of offenders who had been
incarcerated for sex offenses with offenders who had been incarcerated for non-sex offenses. n66 The recidivism base
rate among sex offenders for any offense was 22%, compared to base rates of 32% to 57% for other types of offenders
(property, person, drug, and other). n67 If sex offenders are at minimal risk of sexually re-offending, and are at much
lower risk of general recidivism than non-sex offenders, then specialized policies do not appear to be justified. n68
Other studies of sex offenders also show relatively small percentages of sex-crime recidivism after release. The rate
for an Iowa study of a demographically mixed group [*709] (meaning children, adults, men, and women) was 3% after
approximately four years. n69 Similarly, the rate was 3% in Washington after about five years, n70 and 8% in Ohio at
ten-years. n71 Nonetheless, the base rates reported in the foregoing studies are far below what the public seems to
believe. According to one study, for example, the public placed the recidivism rate of sex offenders at 75%, a dramatic
overestimation. n72
While base rates of sexual recidivism are relatively low in official studies, there are other reasons base rates may
vary. Sex offenders are a heterogeneous grouping, and their variances can have substantial effect on the commission of
sex offenses. For example, there is evidence of differing recidivism rates in subgroups based on factors such as age,
gender, prior incarceration, whether the offender is receiving treatment, and type of sex offense. n73 Still, the foregoing
studies involving mixed populations of predominantly male offenders together are strong evidence that the vast
majority, up to 95% of released sex offenders in the national study, do not sexually reoffend, at least during the
follow-up periods studied. n74 Empirical studies thus tend to show that the image of the reoffending sexual predator is,
while not mythical, not as accurate as the media and politicians assert.
2. Do Sexual Offender Laws Work?
Even if it were true that sexual offenders pose the extreme risk suggested by the sexual predator symbolism, can and do
these SVP laws work in preventing future [*710] sexual violence? Presumably, civil commitment is effective, though
at enormous cost to state coffers and to liberty and privacy interests. n75 The efficacy of registration and residency laws
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is far more questionable. An assumption of registration and residency laws is that dangerous predators are strangers and
that the public can protect itself by being aware of who these people are and controlling where they live. Statistics belie
this assumption. Of the rapes and sexual assaults reported in the National Crime Victimization Survey for 2008, 63% of
female victims and 100% of male victims were attacked by non-strangers. n76 Another national study using police
reports from a five-year period in the 1990s indicates that assaultive sex offenses committed against child victims (less
than eighteen years old) are largely committed by family members (about 34%) and acquaintances (about 59%). n77 In
children under six years, the statistic is more depressing, where almost half of the offenders were family members. n78
In other words, according to these studies, the majority of sexual assaults are perpetrated by persons already known to
their victims. n79 The obvious supposition, then, is that SVP laws are not capable of protecting many victims of sexual
violence as most are those with whom offenders are already familiar and may have continuing access. n80
Another basic theoretical problem regarding the registration system is that it naively presumes that the information
is current, n81 and that citizens access the information and act thereon to protect themselves. n82 A recent study found
that while a large proportion of survey respondents were aware of the existence of their state's public sex offender data
file, most had never accessed it and, of those who did, few took any precautionary measures as a result. n83
Considering a more direct perspective on whether sex offender laws work, studies continue to show that neither sex
offender registry implementation nor residency [*711] restrictions actually reduce recidivism. n84 A likely explanation
is that there appears little doubt that SVP laws conflict with everything that has been learned in the past few decades
about successful reentry efforts. These laws interfere with those important factors that have been shown to mitigate
reoffending, such as support from family, friends, and the community; maintaining a job; and having a healthy place to
live. n85
For example, when the bans involve large areas, sex offenders have congregated in discrete areas, often
socioeconomically and socially challenged neighborhoods, or become homeless. n86 The label of SVP and the
collateral consequences of sexual predator laws also bring social scorn, loss of social support, reduction in employment
possibilities, housing difficulties, and personal harassment. n87 Experts believe that the multiple pressures and lack of
legitimate opportunities increase the risk of recidivism. n88
[*712] There are also ramifications to victims of sex crimes. Stigmatization of offenders and families may lead to
reduced rates of reporting of sexual victimization, particularly when the perpetrators are non-strangers. n89 Regarding
intrafamilial sex offending, the new laws may further discourage family victims from reporting or cooperating in
criminal prosecutions because of the laws' impact on family members' freedom and the potential for public humiliation.
n90 Though many states protect the secrecy of the victims' information in sex crimes, the publication of their offenders'
information may permit others to extrapolate as to the victims' identities, particularly when the victims are family
members. n91
The sheer cost of these policies, in terms of cash outlays and governmental resources, is daunting. An informal
survey recently indicated that the average cost of civil commitment of SVPs across the states was almost $ 100,000 per
person per year. n92 State officials also are complaining about the soaring costs of monitoring sex offenders for
compliance with registration and residency laws. n93 The estimated cost of implementing the national registry, for
example, is $ 1.5 billion. n94
3. Rethinking the Problem
Notably, this Article does not argue that sex offender laws are themselves inherently bad policy. The protection of the
public from the horrendous damage that sexual violence causes is certainly a laudable goal of the government. And the
strong and official condemnation of sexual violence voiced by the policies is commendable. n95 Employing bad science
in future dangerousness assessments, however, does not advance any of these interests.
The Center for Sex Offender Management, a project of the U.S. Department of Justice, warns that effective
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management strategies for SVPs should not be politically based on reactionary public fears of the sex offender
population. n96 To be fair, risk assessment is inherently difficult, and human behavior is largely unpredictable. Yet,
because of the importance of invoking restrictive laws based on judgments of risk, criminal justice officials and the
public should be realistic about the situation. [*713] Proponents need to acknowledge that false positives and false
negatives will commonly occur, and determine if continuing with future dangerousness assessments is justified legally,
socially, and monetarily. n97 If the answer is yes, then at a minimum, we should demand the most empirically sound
risk assessment procedures, learn to better interpret the results offered, and fully understand their advantages as well as
their limitations.
III. Expert Evidence and Sex Offenders
Specialized SVP laws remain an important focus in the justice system's response to sex offenders post-release. Because
the preventive laws are beyond the traditional application of criminal laws, and, indeed, are directed toward potential
future crimes, the application to individual offenders has been substantially based upon assessments of future
dangerousness. Courts commonly call on mental health professionals to provide expert testimony to support these risk
assessments. In turn, experts rely heavily on actuarial tools developed in an effort to standardize the assessment based
on empirical principles. To make their assessments, experts may, but do not always, have access to a variety of data,
from mental health records, criminal records (e.g., police reports, arrest reports, and probation/parole results), treatment
reports, reports from other evaluators, actuarial assessments, diagnostic evaluations, n98 and interviews with the
defendants. This Part begins with a brief overview of evidentiary law as applied to expert witnesses.
A. Expert Evidence Law
The introduction of expert witness testimony in criminal proceedings is not a new idea in the United States, but it is
growing in its influence with the advent of forensics such as fingerprints and DNA. Studies show that a judge's
admission of expert evidence is quite influential upon jurors' acceptance of the expert testimony as scientifically valid.
n99 A recent trend is the growing use of experts to provide evidence based on knowledge gained through use of the
"softer" social sciences. n100 Some of the [*714] common areas in which expert evidence draws upon social science
in the criminal context involve insanity, battered women syndrome, rape trauma, eyewitness identification, and future
dangerousness. n101 While much of the social science expert evidence assists the jury in assessing the facts as they
previously happened, the future dangerousness issue uniquely requires the expert to provide the social context for
determining future facts. n102 While the model for reliability in the traditional hard sciences is based on
experimentation, replication, and validation, the model that social scientists use replaces the experimentation component
with observation. n103 This is true largely because maintaining a truly randomized, controlled experiment in the
atmosphere of a laboratory-like setting when it involves people's social lives is often not practical since it is virtually
impossible to control all potentially relevant variables, and in any event, may be unethical - particularly in the context of
studying the occurrence of violence and sexual harm. n104
Before focusing on the expert rules as applied to future dangerousness testimony, a summary review of expert
evidence law is appropriate. As a general matter, state courts follow either the Frye test for expert testimony or the more
recent Daubert-led standards, though a few states maintain variations of these. n105 The Frye test, adopted by a federal
appellate court in 1923, mandates that expert testimony involving new scientific evidence have proof of reliability.
Reliability is shown if it has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. n106 This is known as an
exercise in "counting heads." n107
In 1975, Congress enacted the influential Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702, which provides that
expert testimony involving scientific, technical, or other specialized testimony is admissible in federal court if it "will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence." n108 Later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
Rule 702 incorporated the Frye standard. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow [*715] Pharmaceuticals, Inc., n109 the Court
ruled that, with Congress' "liberal thrust" for permitting opinion testimony, the Rule displaced Frye and its strict focus
on the general acceptance test. n110 Instead, the Court invoked the broader perspective that scientific evidence is
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admissible if it is valid and reliable, with general acceptance not the entire substitute for these criteria. n111 As the
Court noted, validity asks "does the principle support what it purports to show?" while reliability asks "does application
of the principle produce consistent results?" n112 Invoking the metaphor of the gatekeeper, the Court concluded that
judges themselves should evaluate the scientific reliability and validity of the proposed evidence. n113 The Court
provided some "general observations" to guide judges in determining the validity and reliability of the offered expert
evidence to the case at hand: testability; peer review and publication; methodological standards, including the error rate;
and general acceptance. n114 Hence, general acceptance remained, but only as one of several potentially applicable
criteria. In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented that the majority's approach would cause judges to
become "amateur scientists." n115
Despite Daubert and its progeny, the Supreme Court left many other questions unanswered. For example, it is
unclear whether the presence of any one of the general guideline criteria, even general acceptance, is sufficient if none
of the other criteria are met. n116 Since the Court made clear that its "general observations" were not a dispositive list
of factors to consider, n117 judges also struggle with what other factors may be relevant. Judges must also determine
the degree of reliability required. n118 In the case of SVP laws we might also add a query about whether the standard
for reliability should differ depending on the type of deprivation involved, such as the greater infringement on liberty
inherent in civil commitment statutes or the arguably less onerous burden imposed by registration or residency
requirements.
As between Daubert and Frye, some commentators considered the new conceptualization from Daubert as
potentially more generous than the Frye standard, thus substantively minimizing the role of the general acceptability
standard in federal court. n119 On the other hand, Daubert can also be more limiting. For instance, there may be general
acceptance in the field of astrology about the methods and tools with which [*716] to predict future events based on
planetary movement, but a Daubert-led court likely would exclude the evidence as specious (i.e., unreliable), and thus
inadmissible. n120
Not all state courts follow Daubert, as some continue to follow Frye or some equivalent. n121 Further, many of the
Frye jurisdictions still distinguish between scientific evidence (to which Frye applies) and nonscientific evidence (to
which Frye does not). n122 In addition, for those states strictly following Frye, the reliability (via general acceptance)
question is entertained only if an expert is offered to testify about a new scientific methodology. n123 In states retaining
Frye, then, expert evidence that is either not new or not scientific is not subject to the Frye admissibility standard,
though other general evidentiary rules regarding relevance and prejudice apply. Where the science is novel, a few
courts, while purportedly holding onto the Frye test, require some additional measure of reliability. n124 For example, a
New York court recognized that "general acceptance does not necessarily mean that a majority of the scientists involved
subscribe to the conclusion. Rather it means that those espousing the theory or opinion have followed generally
accepted scientific principles and methodology in evaluating clinical data to reach their conclusions." n125
As a result of this body of law on expert evidence, two observations can be made, perhaps from a cynical
perspective, of the goal-oriented actions that experts and judges appear to use to balance objectivity with efficiency.
First, a consequence of relying upon prior rulings regarding general acceptance is that, once a novel science is admitted
by judges, it maintains a veil of "good science" without meaningful review, despite advances in research and/or
legitimate criticism. Second, experts "in a novel area sharing a common goal may develop a technique that furthers their
professional [*717] aims and they may "generally accept' it regardless of its scientific validity, sometimes despite
strong scientific denial of its underlying premises." n126
This Article suggests that these problems may help explain the state of admissibility decisions on expert evidence
involving dangerousness assessment methodologies using actuarial tools in SVP cases. The result is tautological: if
generally accepted, then it is reliable; actuarial risk assessments are generally accepted; therefore, actuarial risk
assessments are reliable (and truthful).
B. Experts and Future Dangerousness Assessment
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The legal and constitutional bases for permitting experts to testify as to an offender's likelihood of recidivism derive
from the U.S. Supreme Court in the capital punishment sentencing domain. In Barefoot v. Estelle, n127 the Supreme
Court confronted a Texas death penalty statute that permitted a jury to sentence a capital defendant to death only after
answering two questions affirmatively. n128 As pertinent here, one question to be answered, with a dichotomous yes/no
response was whether there was "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society." n129 The issue the Court addressed in the case was the constitutionality
(under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments) of mental health expert witnesses testifying before the jury on the
question of the defendant's future dangerousness. n130 The defendant in Barefoot argued that doing so would violate
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applying to capital cases by contributing to arbitrary and capricious decisions
in death sentencing. n131
In support of the defendant's position that such testimony could not be reliable, the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) submitted an amicus brief in which the professional organization maintained that psychiatric
predictions on recidivism were unreliable and that, in its estimate, two out of three predictions by psychiatrists of
long-term future dangerousness were erroneous. n132 Despite acknowledging the APA's [*718] position, the
six-Justice majority nevertheless ruled against the defendant. n133 The majority explained that it was not convinced that
expert testimony predicting future violence was "entirely unreliable," and in any event, any "shortcomings" could be
effectively minimized during the adversarial process. n134 According to the majority, even the APA did not assert that
psychiatrists were always wrong and, even if many psychiatrists disagreed with the reliability of such predictions, others
were willing to testify and to give their professional opinions about the defendant's future risk of violence. n135 The
three-Justice dissent provided a strong rejoinder, stating that "one can only wonder how juries are to separate valid from
invalid expert opinions when the "experts' themselves are so obviously unable to do so." n136 Further, "when the Court
knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse for imposing on the
defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy burden of convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud." n137
Further, the majority opinion was silent on methodology, and therefore did not expressly consider how the experts
at trial derived their opinions that the defendant, Barefoot, was likely to pose a future danger. The Court merely noted
that one of the state's experts testified that he believed he could competently make a risk prediction about an individual
defendant "if given enough background information." n138
In the entirety of its opinion, the Barefoot majority did not substantively engage the question of evidentiary
reliability standards as applied to violence risk assessment. Instead, the Court appeared more concerned with two
collateral issues. First, the majority worried that if it categorically barred expert evidence on future dangerousness, such
a ruling may present a slippery slope by also undermining the use of experts in other areas of law requiring risk
assessments of danger. The Court specifically cited the use of future dangerousness predictions in bail, parole, and civil
commitment proceedings. n139 Second, the Court noted that since the law requires juries to make this [*719] type of
factual assessment, jurors should at least get some external help. n140 In sum, the Court refused to constitutionally
exclude "an entire category of expert testimony" about future dangerousness. n141
Hence, with the Supreme Court's approval of expert predictions of future violence in death penalty cases, n142 and
with the majority's reference to expert assessments of the risk of violence in civil commitments, it seems reasonable to
extrapolate Barefoot's general conclusion to future dangerousness assessments of sex offenders. Some legal academics
interpret the Barefoot decision as relaxing the evidentiary standard later adopted in Daubert, specifically for expert
testimony on future dangerousness. n143 Still, the Court in Barefoot did not expressly do so as it did not confront the
issue.
This Article maintains that courts should reengage in critically examining the reliability and validity of expert
testimony in future dangerousness contexts. This should apply not only to SVP civil commitment proceedings but also
to the arguably less restrictive regimes where individual assessments of future dangerousness are relevant to the
application of sex offender registry requirements and residency restrictions. The legal conclusion from Barefoot - that
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the Constitution does not require expert predictions on future dangerousness to be categorically excluded - does not end
the analysis. The Court certainly cannot have meant that just anyone could qualify as an expert witness or that any
opinion the expert wishes to give should be admitted. In support of this contention, the Court, since Barefoot, has
become a bit more wary about mental health expert testimony. In Ford v. Wainwright, n144 a case involving the
insanity determination of death row inmates, the Court, citing Barefoot, warned against simply relying upon an expert's
testimony. n145 The Ford majority reasoned that focused questioning of the expert would serve the truth-finding
function
by bringing to light the bases for each expert's beliefs, the precise factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error
or caprice of the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital punishment, the expert's degree of
certainty about his or her own conclusions, and the precise meaning of ambiguous words used in the report. Without
some questioning of the experts concerning their technical conclusions, a factfinder simply cannot be expected to
evaluate the various opinions, particularly when they are themselves inconsistent. n146
[*720] In dicta, the Ford Court also questioned the reliability of the experts' opinions in the underlying case, noting
the "cursory nature of the underlying [joint] psychiatric examination" that appeared "dubious" at best. n147
In capital cases since Barefoot, the Court has expressed more concern about the reliability and truth-assisting nature
of expert testimony on future dangerousness in capital cases. Though not overruling Barefoot on this point, the Court
clarified the remedy to help ameliorate the deficiencies in expert predictions of future crime. For example, if the
prosecution offers a psychiatrist to testify in the sentencing phase about future dangerousness, due process requires that
the state provide the defendant with his own psychiatrist to rebut the prosecution's expert. n148 The significant
consequence of an erroneous decision on future dangerousness based on just the prosecution's expert, the Court found,
was unacceptable. n149
While the Barefoot case did not expressly address actuarial-based assessment of future dangerousness for purposes
of death penalty sentencing, it suggests that the use of mental health experts in risk assessment will continue. This
Article is thus interested in bringing Frye, Daubert, and the broader concepts of reliability and validity back into at least
one aspect of expert testimony on future dangerousness: the use of actuarial assessment tools in SVP determinations.
IV. Actuarial Testing of Future Dangerousness
At the time of Barefoot, experts substantially based their predictions of future dangerousness on their clinical
judgments, n150 while critics complained that clinical assessments were inherently unreliable and subject to bias. n151
Practitioners thereby sought more empirically-based tools that could offer more reliable guides. n152 The development
of actuarial risk tools ensued.
Fundamentally, actuarial risk tools are about deriving statistics from groups. For example, automobile insurance
companies assign policy rates to individuals based on predictive statistics derived from historical, group-based claims
data. For car insurance, the common relevant factors include age, education, vehicle model, and driving history. n153
The general idea for actuarial ratings for any risk at issue is to identify those factors that are correlative to the potential
occurrence of the future event at issue, and to effectively assign appropriate weights to each factor based on the
observation that some factors have greater correlative abilities than others relating to the particular result. The [*721]
theory is that a better model of prediction should be based not on any single risk factor, but an accumulation of relevant
risk factors. n154 The developers of actuarial instruments, therefore, use existing data in an empirical way to create
rules to combine the most relevant factors, provide the applicable weights, and create a final mechanistic score. n155
The assessor then compares the score against the experience tables which yield probabilities of the result observed from
the reference group data. To support the empirical validity of the instruments, the scales are cross-validated by retesting
with other samples.
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Understanding the group-based nature of actuarial assessment tools is crucial. When determining the relative risk
for an individual, the characteristics of the individual common to those in the population upon which the actuarial
model is based are compared and ranked as to the outcome of interest. n156 To return to the automobile insurance
example, the insurer's agent would input a prospective customer's data into the actuarial model to obtain a relative risk
level (and corresponding premium) based on the experiential claims data from those in the historical sample with
similar characteristics.
A. The Sexual Recidivism Actuarial Tests
Two of the most commonly used actuarial prediction tools in SVP determinations are the Rapid Risk Assessment for
Sex Offence Recidivism (RRASOR) and STATIC-99. n157 The RRASOR is the more stream-lined of the two,
assigning points on just four static factors: number of prior sex offenses (from 0 points = no convictions or charges to 3
points = 4 or more convictions or 6 or more charges), age at assessment (meant to be at release) (0 = more than 25
years; 1 = less than 25 years), victim gender (0 = only females; 1 = any male), and relationship to victim (0 = only
related; 1 = any non-related). n158 The items are scored, and the sum of the scores is associated with a certain
recidivism rate over a 5-year and 10-year period based on group statistics observed in developmental samples. n159 For
example, a higher score will result for a subject who has a greater number of prior convictions or charges of sex
offenses, age less than 25 years, any male victims, and at least one extra-familial victim.
The developer of RRASOR created the instrument based on preexisting studies of sex offender reoffending by
identifying the factors that tended to be correlated with [*722] sexual recidivism. n160 In reducing the factors to four,
the developer's goal was to create a "brief, efficient actuarial tool that could be used to assess the risk for sexual offense
recidivism." n161 Because of the goal of efficiency, the developer acknowledged that RRASOR was not a
comprehensive assessment tool. n162
To develop the experience table, the developer used the sexual recidivism rates observed in seven follow-up studies
of released sex offenders in the United States, Canada, and England. n163 Sexual recidivism was variously defined in
the studies as charges, convictions, or readmissions to inpatient psychiatric facilities. n164 The developer then created
the final experience table that associates specific RRASOR scores (1-5) n165 with risk estimates for five-and ten-year
periods. Instead of using the exact observed rates of sexual recidivism from the samples, the final experience table risk
estimates were extrapolated by formula from the observed rates because the samples had varied follow-up periods (2 to
23 years). n166 In the end, the experience table's predictive rates range from a low of 4% sexual recidivism for 0 points
at 5 years to a high of 73% for 5 points at 10 years. n167
STATIC-99 was developed by the RRASOR author with another researcher using four samples of male sex
offenders, totaling just over 1,000, released from Canadian and English institutions. n168 It remains the most commonly
used actuarial tool in the United States for SVP civil commitment hearings because of its resource efficiency. n169 The
resulting tool is a combination of variables from two other instruments, including [*723] all four factors from
RRASOR. n170 The STATIC-99 instrument includes 10 static factors n171:
Age at assessment: Number of prior sentencing
0 = 25 years or older dates:
1 = between 18 and 25 years 0 = 3 or less
1 = 4 or more
Having lived with an age-appropriate Any convictions for a non-
intimate partner for at least 2 years: contact sexual offense:
0 = yes; 1 = no 0 = no; 1 = yes
Any convictions for an Index non-sexual Any nonfamilial victims:
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violent offense: 0 = no; 1 = yes
1 = yes; 0 = no
Any convictions for non-sexual violence Any stranger victims:
before the Index (most recent sexual 0= no; 1 = yes
offense) offense:
1 = yes; 0 = no
Number of prior sex offenses: Any male victims:
0 = none 0 = no; 1 = yes
1 = 1-2 charges or 1 conviction
2 = 3-5 charges or 2-3
convictions
3 = > 6 charges or > 4 convictions
For STATIC-99, total scores range from 0 to 12, arranged within seven risk categories organized into four ordinal risk
groups (from 0 = low risk to 6+ = high risk). n172 The experience table provides 5-, 10-, and 15-year sexual recidivism
rates for each total score from 0 through 6, with 6-12 points sharing the same experience rates. n173 Sexual recidivism
was operationalized as reconviction in three of the samples and either charges or readmission for one sample, and the
final experience rates simply aggregate them. A few examples from the experience table may be helpful. A total score
of 3 provides estimates of sexual recidivism of 12% at 5 years, 14% at 10 years, and 19% at 15 years. n174 The greatest
scores which were grouped into a 6+ range (6-12 points) yields the highest estimates in the experience table of 39% (5
years), 45% (10 [*724] years), and 52% (15 years). n175 Even a score of 0 yields positive estimates of 5%, 11%, and
13% at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals, respectively. n176
The STATIC-99 coding rules indicate that data can be derived from some combination of self-reports, formal
records, and informal records. n177 The test was designed to be used only on adult males who have been charged with
or convicted of a contact sex crime involving a child or a nonconsenting adult. n178 The authors specifically warn that
it is not recommended for females, juveniles, individuals with no prior sex crime, possessors of pornography, or
individuals who have engaged in certain consensual sex activities that are otherwise considered a crime, such as
prostitution, sex in public, and statutory rape. n179
The application of the actuarial predictions to an individual (the defendant) is basically an exercise in inductive
logic: those in the development samples who were like the defendant reoffended X percent of time; ergo the risk that the
defendant will reoffend is similar to X percent. n180 Among its highest risk group (score of 6 or more) and at the
longest follow-up period (15 years), the STATIC-99 indicates a 52% chance of sex reoffending for those in the group
with a score of 6+. So, even for this extreme, many (almost half) did not reoffend. n181 Further, other studies have
failed to replicate the over 50% reoffense rate, even for STATIC-99's high risk group. n182
Neither RRASOR nor STATIC-99 measures the specific type of sexual reoffense (such as rape or child
molestation), or the "severity, imminence, duration, or frequency" of future sexual misconduct. n183 Nor do they limit
their recidivism statistics to predatory sexual violence (which civil commitment laws require without clearly clarifying
the term "predatory"), serious sexual violence, or to contact sexual violence (which registration and residency laws
would seem to target). Both tests consider static factors, that is, factors that are preexisting characteristics at the time of
assessment. [*725] Dynamic factors, factors that can change over time and alter an individual's risk for reoffense, are
highly relevant to an assessment of risk, but are generally ignored. n184 Examples of dynamic risk factors include
treatment, impulsiveness, anger, substance use, and interpersonal relationships. n185 The lack of dynamic factors is a
common lament about the usefulness of actuarial models since, considering the variability of human behavior in
general, risk states ebb and flow over time. n186
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In the years since Barefoot and Hendricks, the use of actuarial tools in risk assessment has increased significantly.
n187 Many mental health professionals who work with risk assessments of future violence claim that actuarial risk
assessments are better and more objective tools than merely using clinical assessments. Some even argue that actuarial
tools represent the best practice in the field. n188 Indeed, there is evidence from sex offender researchers that a vast
majority of mental health evaluators testifying in sexual predator civil commitment hearings use one or more actuarial
instruments. n189 Several state laws outlining the sexual predator classifications require reliance on a specified actuarial
test. n190 Still, even purported best practices should not be admissible as evidence in court if they do not meet the legal
standards of validity and reliability for expert evidence.
B. Empirical Evaluation of Actuarial Evidence of Future Dangerousness
The ability of lawyers and judges to challenge and evaluate expert testimony on future dangerousness is critically
important to the legal legitimacy of SVP litigation. Still, several practical barriers to effective evaluation exist. Humans
are simply hard to predict, making assessments of future behavior impractical. n191 As a result, the [*726] politically
charged atmosphere surrounding the post-release management of sex offenders may lead participants in the process to
err on the side of confirming SVP status rather than risk the consequences of not applying SVP restrictions to those who
eventually reoffend. n192 Expert witnesses admit feeling pressure in the adversarial process to provide positive
assessments of risk without adequately explaining contrary research, and even distorting the limitations of the actuarial
tools. n193 Further, the situation is somewhat unique for the treatment field. The mental health professional who has
previously worked directly with the individual to be assessed (e.g., a therapist or counselor), and who thereby has
greater insight into the individual's likelihood of relapse outside of the limited static factors covered by the tests, is
exactly the one who cannot give predictions in criminal proceedings. Ethics guidelines generally prohibit a professional
from being both the treating professional and testifying expert because the dual roles often conflict. n194 Finally, the
lack of clarity in the complicated field of actuarial risk assessment for sex offenders undermines efforts to logically
assess it as a science. With these challenges in mind, the goal of this section is to provide an empirical assessment of the
actuarial tools in a way that is accessible to legal professionals working in SVP litigation.
1. Testing and the Scientific Method n195
As applicable to sex offenders in the United States, the creators of the actuarial tools took some liberties with pure
scientific method, in particular, the scientific principle that developmental samples underlying actuarial tools designed
to be normative should be representative of the larger population for which the tools are intended. n196 This could
include weighted random sampling to match the population at issue on relevant variables, such as age, gender,
geographic location, treatment, type of sexual offense, etc. The RRASOR and STATIC-99 developmental samples were
derived from a limited number of small, nonrandom samples from mostly Canadian and English institutions, with one
U.S. sample included in RRASOR. n197 Moreover, the [*727] majority of the sex offenders in the samples were
released from maximum security prisons or mental health institutions, and thus may represent higher risk groups than
typical sex offenders. n198 While intending the tools to be applicable on an international scale, there is no sign the
developers made any attempt to conduct truly representative sampling to satisfy scientific principles for a more global
application. n199 Another issue is the fact that the developmental samples included inconsistent definitions of the
outcome variable of recidivism, including charges, readmissions, and/or reconvictions, and used widely varying time
frames for follow-up.
The instruments also obscure common scientific standards for determining the reliability of the scoring system by
failing to provide error rates, n200 as the Daubert court mentioned. n201 For the purpose of risk prediction research, the
error rate is normally reported as a 95% confidence interval. n202 Other researchers recently attempted to fill this gap
by extrapolating confidence intervals from the STATIC-99 data. n203 They found that at the highest risk of the original
STATIC-99 experience table, of 52% for a 15-year period for the 6+ score, the group confidence interval was 43-60%,
while the individual confidence interval was 6-95%. n204 Confidence interval information, a scientifically useful
statistic in social science studies, could be important where a factfinder may lean toward the lower or upper bound of
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the confidence interval in determining whether the defendant meets the relevant legal threshold of future dangerousness.
n205
2. Validity
Measurement of the predictive validity of actuarial tools is useful to appreciating their abilities. "Evidence
demonstrating the predictive validity of any instrument or assessment procedure is of paramount importance when the
goal of the clinician is to draw inferences or conclusions about an individual's likely conduct in the future." n206 Two
common statistical measures of the validity of actuarial tests include the [*728] correlation coefficient and the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). This section will review research results using these statistical measures and
consider them from practical and critical perspectives.
The correlation coefficient is a statistic ranging from - 1.0 to 1.0 that indicates the direction (positive or negative)
and strength of the linear relationship between two variables. For example, height is strongly and positively correlated
with weight, such that the taller a person is the more he or she is likely to weigh. A correlation coefficient of 0 means no
correlation while -1.0 or 1.0 indicates perfect correlation. For our purposes here, we are concerned with how strong the
actuarial assessment is positively associated with sex offense recidivism.
In meta-analyses of international samples, researchers have observed correlation coefficients of .27 n207 and .28
n208 for RRASOR and .33 for STATIC-99. n209 In the social sciences, the strength of a correlation coefficient of .30 is
considered to be only moderately predictive. n210 Yet, since positive correlation coefficients range from 0 (no
correlation) to 1.0, the results are not very strong as a practical matter, particularly when considering the imposition on
liberties and privacy at issue.
Another statistic supports this claim that these tests are rather weak statistical tools. The correlation coefficient
leads to a percentage of the variance statistic (r2) that permits a better understanding of what the instrument can actually
account for in terms of recidivism. n211 Taking the higher correlation listed for STATIC-99, .33, the variance is its
square (.332) which equals .1, or 10%. Thus, 10% of the variance in sexual recidivism can be explained by the
STATIC-99 factors. Alternatively, this means that 90% of what helps influence sex-offense recidivism is based on other
factors. This further suggests that STATIC-99 has little practical significance even if there is a statistically significant
correlation with sexual reoffense. Commentators describe this result as meaning STATIC-99's "high risk" label is a
misnomer, even for its highest risk category of 6+, and that STATIC-99's performance is not much "better than a coin
flip." n212
A more recently adopted statistical measure of predictive accuracy is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC),
which is derived from a plotting of true positives and false positives. n213 Proponents of this statistic indicate that,
unlike a correlation coefficient, the ROC is not reliant upon the base rate of the sample and is therefore useful in order
to compare the accuracy of different instruments on samples with differing base rates. n214 ROC statistics range from 0
to 1.0. A ROC of 0 means the [*729] instrument is completely inaccurate in its predictive ability, whereas a ROC of
1.0 means the instrument is completely accurate; a ROC value of .50 means that the predictive ability of the instrument
is no better than chance, much like the proverbial coin flip. n215 Of course, various studies may report different ROC
values where sample characteristics vary (such as region, type of sex offender, or treatment success) or the study
methods differ.
STATIC-99 has been tested by one of its developers using international samples with ROC scores of between .63
n216 and .70. n217 The developer of RRASOR has also observed ROC scores in various meta-analyses from .59 n218
to .68. n219 In another small study by others, researchers directly compared the ROC rates on the same group of
offenders, yielding comparative ROC scores of .68 for STATIC-99 and .73 for RRASOR. n220 Interestingly,
STATIC-99 did not fare better in its accuracy than RRASOR - it fared slightly worse in some studies - despite the
addition of six factors to the four from RRASOR.
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Correctly interpreting the ROC scores is important. The ROC score of .63 for STATIC-99 means that the test yields
a 63% chance that a recidivist will receive a higher risk ranking than a nonrecidivist. This does not mean that 63% of
the group with those characteristics will reoffend (since the statistic is not dichotomous). It also does not mean that there
is a 63% chance the individual being scored will recidivate (as the model is based on group statistics). n221 Rather, the
ROC statistic is about the accuracy of the relative rankings of the test. n222 The value represents the "probability that a
randomly selected recidivist would have a more deviant score than a randomly selected nonrecidivist." n223
Since the ROC statistic obscures base rate differences between groups, some critics assert that it leads to an
overestimation of risk predictions when base rates change over time and when applied to other groups with lower base
rates than the developmental sample. n224 The authors of STATIC-99 now seem to agree. n225 Recently, the
STATIC-99 developers admitted that their original recidivism experience tables overestimated recidivism risk in light
of reductions in base rates of sexual recidivism. [*730] Indeed, they no longer recommend that experts use the original
estimates. n226 In a meta-analysis of international samples released in 2009, the developers found that the average base
rate of recidivism was 11.6% from over 100 studies with follow-up periods ranging from 6 to 276 months. n227
Compared to the original STATIC-99 data, the 11.6% base rate in the more recent samples was two-thirds of what was
found in the original samples. n228 The developers issued new recidivism estimates to replace the original estimates,
along with new criteria for the use of the replacement-experience table. n229 However, the new table and criteria have
not yet been subject to cross-validation, and it will likely take some time for the field to determine how to consider the
new evidence. To maintain its statistical validity, therefore, potential fluctuations in base rates over time require that
developers re-estimate the tool's risk scores even for the reference group to which it should apply.
It is also important to recognize that one of the most important limitations of actuarial assessments as a rule is the
problem of overgeneralization or, more empirically, external validity. One overgeneralizes results of research by
presuming the results derived from one population (the reference group) are reliable when applied to a second
population. If the second population differs in any risk-relevant way from the reference group, then the predictive result
is invalid. n230 As actuarial testing of future dangerousness for sex offenders is a relatively recent phenomenon and
almost exclusively accomplished on adult male offenders released from prison or mental institutions, the reference
group is notably limited in several risk-relevant ways. One engages in overgeneralization by applying the same actuarial
estimates on sexual recidivism to groups bearing any risk-relevant attribute that significantly differs from the reference
group, such as women, juveniles, incest offenders, older offenders, first time offenders, and those who were not
incarcerated. n231 A number of studies have highlighted this overgeneralization problem, by showing that the
instruments vary, sometimes dramatically, when trying to predict sexually violent recidivism in subgroups. n232
[*731] It is also prudent to be cognizant of the potential differences in reoffending by geographic and cultural
region. For instance, FBI statistics indicate that criminal offending can vary, sometimes significantly, by state and
geographic region of the United States, including for sexual offenses. n233 An author of STATIC-99 conducted a 2009
meta-analysis of international samples that underscored the geographic disparity in predictive ability: the average
STATIC-99 ROC was .90 for the United Kingdom, but only .60 for the United States and .58 in Canada. n234 Hence,
using recidivism statistics based largely on incarcerated populations in England and Canada "should be a great cause of
concern for making recidivism predictions in the United States" n235 as a whole, much less to any particular region of
the United States where recidivism risk may vary.
Another conceptualization of the practical significance of the ROC scores concerns the actuarial tool's positive
predictive accuracy, or the accuracy of predicting reoffending. n236 If we borrow the Department of Justice-sexual
recidivism rate of 5.3%, rounding up to 6% for easy interpretation, and then apply a ROC score of .70, the positive
predictive accuracy measures indicate that the actuarial tool will be wrong 9 times out of 10. n237 This is a common
problem as the prediction of relatively rare events is inherently unreliable. n238 Others tend to agree that because of the
high incidence of false positives with these actuarial tests, the uncritical use of them produces systematic overestimation
of risk. n239
3. Reliability and Objectivity
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Actuarial assessments of risk carry an aura of science and objectivity. n240 Perhaps this is because the use of numerical
percentages and rankings of bounded tiers imbues the predictions with a connotation of mathematical precision. n241 In
addition, the [*732] consistent use of the same factors and scoring methodology across cases reduces the appearance of
bias. n242
A relevant measure of reliability involves interrater reliability, which measures how consistent observers are in
rating the same variable with the same value. In small studies, study observers rate quite high at assigning consistent
results with the same actuarial tools; the correlation coefficients (1.0 meaning perfect) for interrater reliability has been
found to be .95 for RRASOR and .87 for STATIC-99. n243 Still, these scores provide estimates of raters in supervised
studies, presumably with guidelines to assist consistency scores. Outside the structured study environment, there may be
less consistency in scoring the instruments, particularly when adversarial allegiance exists. A study on rater agreement
using STATIC-99 and another actuarial tool in adversarial civil commitment hearings found that while interrater
reliability was high, there was greater variation in ratings by evaluators on opposing sides in SVP hearings than between
experts on the same side. n244 The same study also found that, on average, state experts reported higher risk-score
computations than experts retained by the defendants. n245
Two other issues pertaining to objectivity are concerning. Another type of allegiance effect occurs in which
developers of several of the actuarial tools may have professional incentives to conduct further studies that report results
supporting the validity of their own tools. n246 One study found evidence of allegiance in peer-reviewed validation
studies in which the instrument's author(s) participated. n247 This study's researchers compared the validity coefficients
between studies conducted by the authors of three actuarial instruments for sexual recidivism, including STATIC-99,
and found that on average the instrument authors reported significantly larger correlation coefficients (average r=.37)
compared to non-authors (average r=.28). n248 A recent meta-analysis found that the average ROC for STATIC-99
varied dramatically depending on whether the studies were published (ROC .80; n = 21) or not published (ROC .60; n =
42). n249 This suggests that researchers are more likely to reveal studies with statistically stronger results.
It is also noted that while the RRASOR and STATIC-99 developers intended their instruments to be easily and
objectively scored, there is some room for error based on the availability and veracity of the data. With developers
encouraging raters to access a [*733] broad spectrum of data, including self-reporting, the potential for error is real.
Accurate scoring relies upon good data. Similarly, the probability of missing data may also skew results. When the
factors involving arrest are considered, another source of error occurs since arrests may be overinclusive due to the fact
that arrests are not legally sufficient proof of guilt. Accurate scoring also relies upon adequate training.
4. Training
The authors of the STATIC-99 write in their coding rules that they "strongly recommend training in the use of the
STATIC-99 before attempting risk assessments that may affect human lives." n250 There are no criteria, however, for
the scope, time, or regimen for training or otherwise certifying potential assessors on the actuarial instruments. There
are also no formal or published coding rules or training manuals. Mostly, information is vicariously available on the
internet and through occasional training classes.
5. General Acceptance
The use of actuarial tools for sex offenders in regular treatment is one matter, and there is no reason here to challenge
their general acceptance and use in the treatment setting. Their use in court, where the stakes are qualitatively higher
and the professional standards different, is another matter. Many mental health experts who work in sex offender
treatment believe the actuarial instruments are currently best practice and are willing to use them and testify as to their
conclusions. n251 There are reasons to believe, however, that the tide of approval of actuarial tools - if there indeed was
ever general acceptance - is turning in recent years. Mental health professionals are starting to realize that declining base
rates of sexual recidivism in the United States and the variability of base rates among different sex offender populations
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undermines the continued viability of the experience tables and ROC scores. n252 In an amicus brief in a death penalty
case, the American Psychological Association recently contended that any prediction of dangerousness is unreliable in
court if it does not consider the base rate of the specific population for a set period of time. n253 The American
Psychiatric Association's recent stance has not addressed the actuarial tools directly, [*734] but in a position statement,
it asserts: "Although psychiatrists cannot predict dangerousness with definitive accuracy, they can often identify risk
factors associated with an increased likelihood of violent behavior." n254
Thus, many legal and mental health practitioners and researchers who work in the sex offender area, and who feel
strongly and justifiably about it enough to publish their professional opinions in peer-reviewed journals, warn against
the use of actuarial tests in legal settings because significant limitations with the tests make their use questionable in
light of the significant deprivation of liberty they may facilitate. n255 Putting the use of actuarial evidence in context, a
mental health practitioner extrapolated from the Department of Justice's sex-offender recidivism study to conclude that
using STATIC-99 would have averted only three percent of sexual offenses committed by released offenders (sex
offender and non-sex offenders) while hundreds of nonrecidivists would have been unnecessarily detained. n256
Further, some suggest it may be professionally unethical for mental health practitioners to testify in court about the
likelihood of an individual reoffending, n257 at least without being absolutely clear about all of the substantive
limitations in making such predictions. n258 Others argue that the group-based model of tools means that even if using
the actuarial assessments may be appropriate at initial assessments to consider pursuing civil commitment, mental
health professionals should decline to use them in actual court hearings about individual risk predictions. n259 In sum,
even if there had been general acceptance of RRASOR and STATIC-99 near the time of their inception, such general
acceptance was likely only about their ability for treatment purposes. It is highly questionable whether there ever was -
and even more questionable whether there is [*735] today - a general acceptance in the mental health field about the
validity of using actuarial risk assessments in SVP legal determinations. n260
V. Judicial Perspectives on Future Dangerousness Evidence
Since the Supreme Court approved mental health testimony about future dangerousness and found civil commitment of
sexual predators and registration laws to be constitutional, the introduction of actuarial risk assessments through expert
testimony has become common practice in SVP determinations. Empirical observations about actuarial predictions of
future dangerousness, outlined in Part IV.B above, have not gone entirely unnoticed. In a general, retrospective critique,
Janus and Prentky summarized the development of conflict between science and law in SVP litigation as follows:
Suddenly, courts were confronted with a number of potentially embarrassing facts: the group-based nature of risk
assessment, the tension of applying probabilistic estimates from life tables to defendants who departed significantly
from the membership of the reference groups used to derive the estimates, the difficulty of evaluating and incorporating
dynamic risk factors, and the problem of translating statutory language into scientifically meaningful terms all became
quite clear. n261
Some observers assert that the common judicial reaction to these issues has been to permit expert testimony without
any meaningful inquiry into the scientific validity and reliability of actuarial assessments. n262 This Part examines the
evidence that supports this observation by reviewing the main themes that emerge from a comprehensive review of case
law in which either of the actuarial tools addressed in this Article was mentioned.
A. Daubert/Frye Challenges
Overall, courts have not been inclined to find challenges to the reliability of actuarial tests to be dispositive about the
admissibility of actuarial evidence. Indeed, relatively few courts considering the admissibility of RRASOR or
STATIC-99 have conducted any type of reliability analysis, whether Daubert, Frye, or a variant thereof. Most of the
discussion in the cases has been on other issues, such as sufficiency of the evidence, due process, or ineffective
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assistance of counsel. The courts have employed common strategies for averting the reliability issue.
1. Frye Challenges
Of those cases referring to Frye, there has been a split as to whether Frye applied at all to the actuarial tests. First, most
Frye-based courts have declined to hold Frye [*736] hearings to determine the admissibility of actuarial-based
evidence based on these courts' determination that the actuarial tool is not a scientific test, making the Frye general
acceptance test inapplicable. n263 Most of these courts ended the matter there, without further explication. Still, a few
opinions have referred to precedent holding that medical testimony does not constitute scientific evidence for purposes
of Frye. According to these courts, since a mental health professional's assessment of future dangerousness is medical
testimony, it cannot be scientific evidence. n264 A few judges have also explained that because actuarial tools on future
dangerousness have a predictive value "far less than 100%," they cannot "have an aura of scientific infallibility" with
which Frye is concerned. n265 This was true despite experts in other cases referring to the actuarial tools in scientific
terms. n266
The consequence of the no-science, no-Frye ruling was made quite clear by a California appellate court. In
overruling the trial court's decision that STATIC-99 was unreliable, the appellate court stated that "while the accuracy
rate of 71 percent may not meet the certainty requirements applicable to new scientific evidence, such requirements
have no application to expert psychological opinion testimony based in part on actuarial instruments." n267 A
reasonable implication, then, was that if Frye applied, the appellate panel thought that the actuarial tool would be
inadmissible. But, as shall be seen, this implication has not been adopted by other courts.
The alternative Frye path is evident among courts that assume, with little or no discussion, that actuarial tests of
future dangerousness constitute scientific evidence for which a Frye hearing is appropriate. Almost all of these courts
have found the tests to be reliable on the asserted basis that they are generally accepted and thereby require no further
validation. n268 At least one Frye court, however, has ruled that STATIC-99 is "not scientifically accepted" for the
purpose of determining the requisite "mental abnormality" under the state's civil commitment statute (where recidivism
risk was not at issue). n269
[*737] In the two primary applications of Frye, the impact of case law precedent has been of utmost importance in
the courts' decisions. Most of the decisions have not sought to justify either the Frye-inapplicable ruling or the general
acceptance determination with much of an independent analysis. Instead, almost all of the cases have relied expressly
upon case precedent. n270 As an example, the Illinois Supreme Court found it important that "at least 19 other states
rely upon actuarial risk assessment in forming their opinions on sex offenders' risks of recidivism" and "eight of these
states have directly addressed the Frye question." n271 The court recognized that reliance upon case law precedent may
be a "hollow ritual," but justified it by arguing that the issue of general acceptance had been "thoroughly litigated"
already in several other states. n272 The Illinois high court specifically pointed to a Florida case which held a Frye
hearing and found general acceptance based on the affirming testimony of the experts in the underlying case and a list
of academic papers. n273 Notably, as the Florida court had acknowledged, many of the academic articles relied upon
were authored by "those who have developed the actuarial tools." n274
2. Daubert and Alternatives
Daubert analyses have been virtually absent in the SVP case law to date. The few courts to analyze actuarial risk
assessments under Daubert have found them admissible. In United States v. Shields, n275 the district judge summarily
admitted actuarial-based predictions, concisely concluding the standards of general acceptance and peer review had
been met, without further discussion. n276 Another court, finding that STATIC-99 was scientific evidence, also
summarily ruled - based upon the state expert's assertions - that the tool satisfied Daubert. n277
A court in a state that has rejected Frye's general acceptance standard concluded that actuarial evidence is
sufficiently reliable to be admissible, based in part on finding no other courts had excluded it. n278 A few cases have
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eschewed the reliability question by referring, in summary terms, to the influence of Barefoot on future dangerousness
testimony. n279 One court acknowledged the seeming inconsistency between Daubert and [*738] Barefoot on future
dangerousness testimony, but dismissed it. n280 A few others have pointed to Barefoot as holding that the question of
reliability in actuarial-assessment testimony goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. n281
Another strategy courts have employed to avoid directly addressing the reliability issue has been to contextualize
the actuarial assessment as not being the sole basis for the expert's opinion. n282 One court, for instance, ruled that even
if the experts used STATIC-99 heavily in their testimony, the fact that the results were merely a part of their overall
assessments meant the defendant's "quibbles with their methodology in employing [STATIC-99] are irrelevant." n283
Another court expressly declined to "second-guess" the experts in their use of the actuarial tests, contending it was up to
the defense to have an expert challenge the tests rather than look to the courts to do so. n284
Overall, there has been little substantive critique of the empirical quality of the actuarial-based assessments. Judges
who have paid heed to the issue have done so mostly in lone dissents or concurrences. n285 One concurring judge, for
example, complained that RRASOR used "only" four simple factors in scoring. n286 Another judge put it in simple
terms:
Intuitively, I find it hard to believe that the knowledge that an 18-year-old man has one conviction for lewd behavior
involving an unrelated boy is sufficient information to conclude that there is a 48.6% probability that the man will
commit a violent sexual crime during the next decade. It also troubles me that [the defendant] can successfully complete
a full course of rehabilitation and the RRASOR will not have changed its assessment of him. [*739] With or without
successful treatment, he has a 48.6% chance of doing a bad act in the future according to this test. n287
A dissenting judge in another case also criticized the use of STATIC-99 due to its failure to incorporate dynamic
factors that could reduce the individual's risk and warned: "Does anyone remember the Soviets' misuse of their mental
health system for incarcerating enemies of the state? Does this seem at all similar?" n288 Notably, in contrast to the
majority opinions, the critical opinions have gone beyond legal precedent and have cited extensively to empirical
publications challenging actuarial assessments. n289
The eminent Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has done perhaps the best job of
trying to understand the limits of actuarial assessment, albeit in a sentencing guidelines case. In United States v.
McIlrath, n290 the defendant called a forensic psychologist to testify at the defendant's sentencing hearing on a charge
involving internet predation of a minor. The doctor testified he used STATIC-99 and derived an estimate of a nine to
thirteen percent sexual recidivism risk. n291 McIlrath appealed on the claim that his sentence was too severe. While
Judge Posner affirmed the sentence, he pointedly questioned the expert's use of the actuarial tool. Posner expressed
frustration that neither party demonstrated whether STATIC-99 had been validated by generally accepted methods or
whether the test would pass the Daubert admissibility standard. n292 Posner then, seemingly sua sponte, raised the
empirical issues that would support the devaluation of the expert's risk assessment, though without making any
conclusions. n293 The court indicated that even the advocates of STATIC-99 admitted its moderate predictive accuracy
and that even though "it may be more accurate than clinical assessments, ... that might not be saying much." n294
Evidence abounds that glossing over of reliability issue may be pragmatic. This can be implied from some of the
unnecessary dicta that judges have provided in cases where the relevant Daubert or Frye standard does not exclude the
actuarial evidence. In support of its approval of actuarial evidence, for example, a state court pointed to the fact that "in
several jurisdictions actuarial risk assessment is mandated by either statute or regulation." n295 In a more dramatic
ceding of this question, one opinion involving a challenge to STATIC-99 evidence stated that courts must "respect [the]
policy of [the] [*740] legislature with respect to the trustworthiness of psychiatric opinion evidence in cases involving
sexually dangerous persons." n296 Other courts, after ruling that neither Daubert nor Frye applied, have repeated that,
"where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is dangerous or likely to be dangerous,
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expert prediction may be the only evidence available." n297
An unusual case involving a conflicted expert helps to further illustrate the role of pragmatism. In State v. Nichols,
n298 a sex-offender registration case, the defendant was classified based, in part, on being assigned a score of 5 on
STATIC-99. n299 In appealing the risk designation to the court, the defendant called as an expert a mental health
professional who was at that time a member of the Sex Offender Review Board (SORB), the state agency responsible
for making initial determinations of a sex offender's classification level. n300 When challenged about the STATIC-99
score, the expert responded "I've never been a Static-99 fan." n301 The judges were clearly appalled:
This response the Court finds to be somewhat shocking in that the SORB consistently uses this risk assessment tool in
deciding the risk to re-offend. One would think that as the professional, a "sex offender treatment specialist" appointed
to the board because of his expertise would have challenged the use of this tool in assessing risk. n302
As a result, the court found that the defense expert's testimony was not credible and it upheld the state's classification
level. n303
B. The Standard of Likelihood to Sexually Reoffend
The intersection between legal language and scientific knowledge used in the mental health fields has proven
challenging in SVP cases. The terminology used in the SVP laws varies somewhat by state and it is unclear whether
there is any meaningful difference between them. For example, in civil commitment laws, the future dangerousness
concept for sexual violence is variously described in statutes as "likely," n304 "more likely than not," n305 "substantial
probability," n306 and "irresponsible [*741] for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters." n307 Two statutes
with the "likely" term define it further as "more likely than not" n308 while other laws define it to be a "propensity ... of
such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others." n309 These definitions are hardly clear. Does the
"more likely than not" mean fifty-one percent chance? Some mental health experts working with sexual predator
assessments seem to think so. n310 The California Supreme Court rejected the idea that "likely" was synonymous with
"more likely than not," ruling instead that it referred to a "serious and well-founded risk." n311 This court implied this
standard was less burdensome than "more likely than not" but provided no substantive guidance. Another court defined
the statutory "likely" language to mean "probable rather than merely possible." n312
With the allure of the seeming certainty from the definitive numbers derived from the actuarial tools, one could
reasonably desire - considering the dramatic consequences of SVP laws - that legislatures provide more specific
guidelines on the threshold levels of risk that equate to likelihood of reoffending. However, "while some states" have
quantified this requisite threshold, "most have not." n313 The normative question of what the threshold should be is one
"that science simply cannot answer." n314 Would a one-percent risk of recidivism be sufficient to justify civil
commitment, or would the risk need to be well above fifty percent? n315 The lack of any meaningful articulation of the
legal standards, coupled with the empirically doubtful nature of future-dangerousness actuarial tools, creates a risk of
arbitrary and capricious decisions as courts apply vague laws with inadequate science.
The criteria for sex offender registry tiers are often no more helpful. Several state registration acts provide three
levels of classification that relate to the specific registration requirements, differentiating them with simple
categorizations of risk of [*742] sexual recidivism ("low," "moderate," and "high"), without further statutory
definition. n316
The statutes also leave open the question about the relevant time period for which future dangerousness is assessed:
one day; one year; five years; twenty-five years; life? It is further unclear whether the relevant time period differs
depending on whether the case concerns civil commitment or registration. To date, few courts have addressed these
issues. This is true despite RRASOR and STATIC-99 experience tables being typically based on five-, ten-, and
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fifteen-year follow-up periods. Of the few opinions addressing the time issue, one court, noting that the legislature had
not specified any particular time period of risk for its SVP civil commitment statute, expressly declined to specify one.
n317 Instead, the court, referring to the legislature's recognition that sexual predators need long-term care, ruled that it
would not adopt the one-year risk period that the defendant suggested. n318 On the other hand, other courts that have
reviewed civil commitment statutes have acknowledged a lack of temporal specificity in the laws, but have noted that
the present-tense language should be construed to mean dangerous at the time of the proposed commitment. n319 Still,
these courts have summarily accepted the long-term actuarial evidence as relevant to determining the defendants'
immediate risk. n320
In re Civil Commitment of K.S. n321 is a case that illustrates the temporal risk conundrum. The court considered
the "high risk" assessment from STATIC-99 as relevant to the defendant's current risk of reoffending, despite
acknowledging that STATIC-99 measured long-term risk potential. n322 The risk assessment, however, was provided
at a 2007 hearing for a continued civil commitment, while the high-risk score was based on offenses occurring in 1975,
1982, and 1989, and the defendant had been continuously incarcerated since his 1989 conviction. n323 The court's
almost complete disregard of the temporal issue - by making a determination of immediate risk based on actuarial
assessments for five to fifteen year risk periods - suggests a judicial concern for pragmatism, since no known empirical
tools adequately assesses imminent risk. Yet, assessing immediate risk based upon long-term projections also suggests a
certain arbitrary and capricious quality to SVP determinations.
With respect to the likelihood standard, there has been a strong tendency to highlight actuarial predictions that were
around or exceeded the 50% mark, even if they [*743] used fifteen-year experience scores to reach it. n324 Opinions
have clearly stated that the over 50% actuarial scores legally met the "more likely than not" standard. n325 A
STATIC-99 score of six can be enough to conclude the defendant "comes out over 50 percent," thereby meeting the
"likely" to sexually reoffend threshold. n326 In a unique case, one court upheld the expert's statement that an actuarial
score of 52% meant the defendant was "still above the threshold that is represented by the term, "likely,'" despite the
defendant's voluntary castration. n327 Other courts have been clear that high actuarial scores strongly influence their
determination of SVP status. n328
Notwithstanding the accepted relevance of 50% actuarial scores in supporting sufficiency of the evidence queries,
many opinions have upheld sex-offender classifications in the face of actuarial scores of far less than 50%. Several
opinions, for example, have referred to the state expert as starting their analysis by calculating the actuarial-based risk
estimate and then adding percentage points, reportedly based on additional risk factors beyond the scope of the testing
instruments. n329 Some experts have described the actuarial numbers as providing a baseline for which the experts can
adjust based on other factors. n330 In contrast, another expert testified that "there was no empirical method of adding
variables" to individually tailor the Static-99 results. n331 There is, indeed, no empirical evidence that modifying
actuarial scores improves the accuracy of predictions. n332 Instead, it appears that the modified scores end up being
[*744] "little more than empirical window dressing for clinical judgment," which the actuarial tools were designed to
improve upon. n333
Many other courts have affirmed sex-offender status despite actuarial-based risk estimates below fifty percent.
n334 In Pedroza v. State, n335 for example, the sexual predator label was upheld in the face of low actuarial scores. In
the case, the prosecutor had argued that even low scores from actuarial tools are sufficient to constitute the legal
standard of "likely" to reoffend:
Even taking [the expert's] tests, the RRASOR, about 11% failure rate after ten years. The SORAG was, I think - did he
say 17% after seven years. Another one, ... about 12% he's likely to reoffend. The base rate for all offenders was 22%.
All that sounds like "likely to reoffend,' you know. The only - it's only about 12% chance here that you have cancer or
are going to die. Whoa, whoa, whoa! That's pretty scary when we're talking about human lives and behavior. That's
"likely." n336
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The jury agreed and Pedroza was civilly committed. The appellate court affirmed, with a strong dissent arguing that the
risk percentages were too low to legally constitute "likely" in face of the defendant's liberty interest. n337
C. Battle of the Experts
Case law provides considerable support for the criticism that actuarial assessments remain subject to the influences of
adversarial allegiance and subjective bias. One area of disagreement has been whether or not the specific actuarial tools
are generally accepted. Where there has been contention, state experts have tended to argue that the tools are generally
accepted, while defense experts have asserted the opposite. n338 When asked about professional acceptance of actuarial
instruments (including RRASOR), one defense expert warned:
I think it's a real concern here that these instruments promise something they don't deliver. And they have an incredible
aura of scientific certainty and preciseness that's just not there if you peel away the second layer of the onion.
Therefore, I think psychologists do a disservice to the profession and psychiatrists, too, for that matter, when they use
them and act as if there's this precision and with a scientific basis that's not really there. n339
[*745] Another defense expert more dramatically charged that the state's experts were conducting themselves
unethically in using the actuarial tools. n340
There has also been some disagreement between opposing experts in computing scores using the same actuarial
instrument, in directions consistent with party affiliation. Almost always, the state experts give higher risk predictions
than defense experts. n341 One state expert averred that a California study showed prisoners like the defendant with a
STATIC-99 score of eight "had a 100 percent rate of sexually reoffending." n342 Another state expert opined that the
high STATIC-99 score meant simply that the question was not if the defendant would sexually reoffend, but when.
n343
Many courts have permitted the experts themselves to opine as to whether the particular defendant is likely to
reoffend. This is not surprising since many jurisdictions' evidence rules permit experts to testify on the ultimate issue,
n344 here the individual defendant's risk of recidivism. State experts have opined that the defendant is "highly likely,"
n345 has a "high likelihood," n346 and is "more likely than not" n347 to sexually reoffend; that the defendant poses an
"unacceptable public risk"; n348 and that the risks of reoffense are "substantially probable." n349
As previously noted, many cases have found sufficient evidence of the defendant's likelihood of reoffending to
assign SVP status when the actuarial results are around or above fifty percent. Even, however, when the actuarial results
are below fifty percent, courts have generally upheld the states' cases for sex-offender status. In one case affirming the
SVP classification for registration purposes (with a "likely" to reoffend criterion), the court was unconcerned with a
STATIC-99 score that associated with a nineteen percent chance of reoffending in fifteen years: "We believe that his
one in five chance of committing a sexually oriented offense in the next 15 years could be viewed as unacceptably
high." n350 Judicial affirmance of SVP classifications has occurred, interestingly enough, even when the state's own
expert(s) have given low actuarial scores. n351 Notably, in these cases, the state experts have supported the [*746]
continued use and practical abilities of the actuarial instruments. n352 Presumably this widespread advocacy by state
experts is due to the states' interest in maintaining the role of actuarial tools in sex offender proceedings. In order to
accomplish this seemingly contradictory approach, the experts have employed, and the courts have adopted, two general
tactics, often in combination: downplaying the absolute need for high actual-based risk estimates in every case, while
endorsing clinical judgments to support raising the actuarial-based risk estimations.
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Thus, while opining that the defendant is likely to reoffend, state experts have not claimed the actuarial tools are
wholly flawed. Instead, their argument has been one directional: the experience tables underestimate risk, either as a
whole or as applied to the individual. In other words, the state experts in these cases tend to convey that the instruments
themselves are acceptable but that the experience tables underestimate (never overestimate) risk. n353 Some experts
have explained that consistent underestimates are possible because the actuarial tools are based on studies that used
convictions, rather than charges, as the endpoint for measuring recidivism. n354 There has been virtually no counter
challenge that, in fact, the developers of RRASOR and STATIC-99 have made it clear the recidivism experience tables
are based on samples with recidivism definitions that variously include charges, convictions, and readmissions. n355
While most experts have not tried to estimate the size of the purported underestimation, there are some exceptions.
One researcher, for example, contends that actual reoffense rates are three times higher than the rates reported in the
actuarial tables, n356 while another expert claims that the actual rates are five times those reported by the STATIC-99
instrument. n357 In People v. McGee, n358 the expert justified his hugely inflated assessment of the defendant's
recidivism risk by arguing that, although the defendant only scored a three on STATIC-99 (for which the experience
table provided a nineteen percent risk of sexual reoffense in fifteen years), he "was one of the thirty [*747] percent of
persons for whom the STATIC-99 test did not diagnose properly." n359 In another case, the expert argued that the
STATIC-99 rate was inaccurately low as to the defendant since STATIC-99 is "slanted towards people who are not very
good at hiding their offenses and a clever offender tends to get a lower score." n360
In many cases involving lower actuarial scores, state experts have cited the importance of other risk factors,
observed in their clinical assessment, which are not considered by the instruments. n361 In accepting the
clinically-derived risk factors as evidence to support a higher risk of future dangerousness, courts have concluded that
the actuarial evidence, while relevant, is not dispositive as a matter of law. n362 This is evident where courts have
upheld sex offender status decisions despite actuarial scoring of zero points. n363 One court, which upheld a
sexual-predator classification for a defendant with an actuarial score of zero (based on expert testimony about the
presence of other risk factors), noted that even with an actuarial score of zero, the tools indicated at least a five percent
risk level of reoffending within five years. n364
There have also been differences in how both sides of the adversarial process have articulated the benefits and
limitations of the actuarial tools. Defense experts have been much more critical about the accuracy of the actuarial
instruments as a whole and much more likely to be cited as specifying weaknesses in the tests. n365 Also, while state
[*748] experts have often claimed that the experience tables underestimate the risk of reoffense, defense experts have
argued the opposite. n366 Indeed, various defense experts argue that the experience tables overestimate risk because the
test overincludes the types of sex offenses that qualify under SVP laws (such as those involving violence), n367 or
because they are based largely on non-diverse samples of high-risk offenders from outside the United States n368 where
base rates of offending exceed the United States. n369 Defense experts have also been more likely to decline calculating
an actuarial score for defendants, based on their belief that the group-based models should not be used for
individualized assessments, n370 are generally inaccurate, n371 and/or are not validated on juveniles n372 or other
subpopulations of which the defendant is a member. n373 As noted [*749] by one defense expert, STATIC-99 is
"confusing, distracting, and intellectually dishonest." n374
In sum, the cases to date indicate that scoring the actuarial factors may not be as objective and simple as desired
since differences of opinion in the coding rules have emerged, despite the few factors that are involved. In addition,
adversarial allegiance is evident in the divergent paths that state and defense experts have taken in their approach to, and
assessment of, actuarial tools. Courts, however, have consistently sided with the state experts' approach. The overall
trend suggests a certain arbitrariness with respect to the influence of actuarial evidence. When the actuarial tool shows a
high risk (greater than fifty percent), little additional support has been needed to support an SVP determination. But
even if the actuarial score has been less than fifty percent, as low as zero, state experts and courts have still supported
sexual-predator classifications, based on non-actuarial evidence. This trend has been consistent despite many defense
experts providing specific information undermining the reliability and validity of actuarial assessments.
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D.
(Mis)Interpretation of Actuarial Prediction
By critically analyzing the appellate opinions to date, it is clear that many experts and courts have erroneously
interpreted the actuarial tools and their purposes. This section outlines four types of interpretive problems. The first,
which is quite common among the cases, is the improper interpretation that group-based scores provide risk-assessment
estimates that are individualized to specific defendants. n375 In describing the general usefulness of actuarial results to
individual predictions, for example, one opinion stated that the STATIC-99 actuarial instrument "calculated defendant's
risk of reoffense," n376 while another court referred to an expert stating that actuarial instruments are "commonly used
to assess an individual's risk of recidivism." n377 Further illustrating this interpretative error, one opinion described
actuarial tools as "instruments that [*750] experts use[] to determine whether a defendant qualifies as a sexually
violent predator." n378
In addition, in many cases, the expert has directly imputed the actuarial risk statistic from the experience table to
the specific defendant. n379 Examples include an expert testifying that the defendant's score of seven on STATIC-99
"means that the likelihood of [the defendant] being convicted of a new sex offense is 39% within 5 years" n380 and
another expert stating that the results of RRASOR and STATIC-99 "indicated that [the defendant] was likely to
reoffend." n381 An expert in another recent case contended that STATIC-99 could "diagnose properly" an individual's
risk, a judgment which the court adopted. n382 This individualization of actuarial scores is in direct conflict with the
instructions of STATIC-99's developers that the tool cannot be used in this manner. n383
Conveying the experience-table result as a group-based statistic (rather than an individually-tailored one) has also
generally favored the state as well. While courts have tended to accept the individualized statistic when the
actuarial-based risk estimate is high, they have tended to highlight the group-based nature of actuarial scores when the
results are low. n384
[*751] The second interpretive problem is evident in opinions that present erroneous representations of the
actuarial tools. Many appellate opinions refer to expert testimony about the actuarial test results that appears
inconsistent with, even contradictory to, the actual tests the experts purported to use. One expert, for example, used the
meta-analysis that helped form the resulting RRASOR and STATIC-99 tests as if the meta-analysis were itself an
actuarial tool, contrary to the developer's specific intention. n385 Another state expert used STATIC-99 to support his
assessment that the young defendant was likely to reoffend, despite the other state expert's critique that the tool was not
appropriate for adolescents. n386 Regardless, the court upheld the evidentiary use of the actuarial score to civilly
commit the defendant, even though the defendant was fourteen-years-old at the time of his sexual offense and had been
incarcerated or in detention ever since, without further charges. n387
In another case, the opinion erroneously indicated that STATIC-99 was a tool to diagnose psychiatric disorders,
explaining that STATIC-99 "measures both paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder." n388 Additionally, some
experts have created new hierarchies, asserting that STATIC-99 placed the defendant in a category of "very high risk"
n389 or "extremely high" risk, n390 despite the top STATIC-99 ordinal grouping of "high risk." n391 Another expert
has stated that, according to STATIC-99, the defendant was "in a class almost by himself." n392 Other
misrepresentations have involved the specifics of how the actuarial tests were developed, n393 scoring methodology,
n394 the [*752] tools' definition of recidivism, n395 and what type of recidivism a specific actuarial tool was designed
to predict. n396 While none of these, on their own, may be hugely important to the resulting SVP-status decisions, they
cause one to pause in considering the quality of the training, experience, and care experts have taken with respect to
their actuarial assessments. These examples are also helpful in that the opinions lack any indication that such errors had
been revealed by Daubert's and Barefoot's adversarial check of cross-examination or the appellate review process.
The third interpretive issue involves scoring discrepancies. Despite the purported ease of RRASOR and
STATIC-99 scoring, several cases document state experts changing their scores of the defendant. n397 In addition, there
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have been discrepancies in the scoring of defendants, both between experts on competing sides n398 and between the
two or more experts on the same side. n399 The courts in these cases have generally [*753] treated these discrepancies
as issues of fact rather than as problems inherent in the instruments and their scoring rules.
The fourth interpretive problem involves how the experts convey the significance of using multiple actuarial tools.
Here, a common empirical flaw has been to characterize the use of multiple actuarial tools as somehow strengthening
the reliability of scores from the individual tools, at least when they are relatively consistent in the direction of their risk
predictions. For example, in People v. Calderon, n400 the court stated that the expert "confirmed the accuracy" of
STATIC-99 results by comparing them with those obtained from RRASOR and noted that each tool "relies on a
different basis of prediction." n401 Other experts have also based their predictions of future dangerousness on the
reinforcing RRASOR and STATIC-99 scores, with no mention in the appellate opinions of the tests' overlapping nature.
n402 Issues with intercorrelation between variables makes this problematic as RRASOR and STATIC-99 share several
factors n403 derived from the same offender-recidivism literature by the same developers. n404 An empirical study
found that the practice of using multiple tools does not result in a statistically significant better prediction than would be
provided by using the single best actuarial risk scale. n405 On the other hand, a study found that less than five percent
of its sample received consistent rankings of high risk or low risk using each of five actuarial tools, including RRASOR
and STATIC-99. n406
Despite the multiple criticisms of actuarial risk assessment as conveyed in this Part, defendants have been unable to
prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claims when their lawyers fail to properly challenge the admissibility,
validity, and interpretation of the actuarial tools. n407 Criticisms of actuarial risk assessments, however, including the
vagueness and variability of the likelihood standard, adversarial allegiance, and the frequent misinterpretations of the
actuarial tests merit further [*754] attention. The disconnect between legal language and the scientific judgments by
mental health professionals does a disservice to the interests of justice and underscores the inconsistency of the legal
standards among cases.
VI.
Conclusion
In order to balance the goals of protecting the public while adhering to the constitutional principles of liberty and
privacy, legal actors in the criminal justice process have an ethical duty to critically evaluate scientific testimony that is
offered as expert evidence. Some practitioners and academics with joint law and doctoral credentials have argued for a
ban on actuarial risk assessment as unreliable science in SVP proceedings. n408 This author supports such a ban, not
only because of the significant problems with using group-based actuarial tools to predict individual behavior, but also
because of the absence of legal criteria to guide the use of such tools under current SVP laws.
There are a number of reasons why legal personnel may be loath to challenge mental health experts' evidence of
future dangerousness. First, it could be the natural "desire for authoritative methods for generating knowledge." n409
The aura of objectivity and science serves this positivist aim. n410 Second, judges may be relying upon the adversarial
process, pursuant to Daubert and Barefoot, to weed out bad science. By doing so, however, judges are eschewing their
gatekeeping obligations onto attorneys, who may also be ill-equipped in terms of scientific literacy. n411 The
discussion of existing case law in Part V emphasizes the failure of both the adversarial process and judicial gatekeeping
in challenging this suspect science. Third, SVP laws are an area of law which invokes passionate responses and moral
judgments. n412 And, finally, some argue that the legislatures created sexual predator laws with the future
dangerousness concept and, thus, we (mental health experts, judges, and lawyers) need to use the best available
evidence to make those decision - even if the legal standards remain vague, and even though current models of actuarial
risk assessment suffer large gaps in validity and reliability. n413 This reasoning, however, exalts the political over the
legal.
[*755] For purposes of my point, assume there is empirical evidence that an astrology-based model of risk
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assessment is shown to be better than chance. Then assume that the astrology model is empirically shown to be a better
predictor than a psychic model of risk assessment. Would these facts justify the acceptance of the astrology-based risk
tool as scientifically valid? And, would this be enough to justify its use as evidence in judicial proceedings in which an
individual's liberty and privacy is at stake? n414
Advocating for a new sex offender policy is beyond the scope of this Article. Still, considering the myths about the
recidivism risk of sex offenders that led to the rise of SVP laws, there is a strong basis for simply getting back to the
basics of transparent sentencing policy, if the intent is to rely directly on punitive incarceration. There is also potential
to engage the rehabilitative possibilities offered by much work done in recent years in sexual-offender treatment. n415
In the end, officials will likely continue to believe that political and public interests are best served by the current
SVP regime's reliance on actuarial risk assessment tools. n416 The naturalistic fallacy (i.e., confusing what is with what
one thinks ought to be), in terms of having an objective ability to predict risk, is not an uncommon tendency. Historical
juridical authority, though, should not be entirely ceded in protecting what constitutes expert evidence in law. The
justice system must use the Daubert and Frye standards to critically analyze predictions of future dangerousness in the
SVP context. Actuarial assessments of risk are couched in terms of science and objectivity and thus should be evaluated
regularly for their reliability and validity.
Education is key for those involved in SVP-status determinations, not only as to the ability of actuarial science to
accurately predict future dangerousness, but also how best to challenge actuarial assessments in court to ensure that only
those tools that are sufficiently reliable and valid are admissible. n417 The ability of legal professionals to better
understand and critically analyze science is a matter of additional learning; guidance is available. n418 If this Article is
not convincing on the suspect nature of the [*756] science of future-dangerousness evidence, at the very least it
provides some assistance for digging deeper into the empirical nature of actuarial tests. Constitutional principles and
evidentiary rules require adherence to rationality despite the mythical specter of a growing population of dangerous
sexual predators.
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Criminal Law & ProcedurePostconviction ProceedingsSex OffendersCivil CommitmentsCriminal Law &
ProcedurePostconviction ProceedingsSex OffendersResidency RestrictionsEvidenceScientific EvidenceDaubert
Standard
FOOTNOTES:
n1. The term "preventive state," coined by Professor Carol Steiker, refers to a state that "attempts to identify
and neutralize dangerous individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a variety of ways."
Carol Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771, 774 (1998). For a
comparison of sex offender laws before and after September 11, 2011, see Dannye Holley, The Supreme Courts:
Did September 11th Accelerate Their Sanctioning the Constitutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion?, 7 Pierce L.
Rev. 39, 60-63 (2008).
n2. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-Decade Retrospective, 21 Fed.
Sent'g Rep. 90, 95 (2008) (noting that "profiling designed to identify "dangerous people' ... destroyed the lives of
many innocent Americans" during Cold War and suggesting similar risks may result from resuming such
practices against sex offenders and suspected terrorists).
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n3. See Eric S. Janus, Failure to Protect: America's Sexual Predator Laws and the Rise of the Preventive
State 5 (2006) (arguing that "preventive detention" approach of sexual predator laws constitute "radical assault"
on fundamental principles of U.S. criminal justice system).
n4. Janus & Prentky, supra note 2, at 90.
n5. Daniel F. Montaldi, The Logic of Sexually Violent Predator Status in the United States of America, 2
Sexual Offender Treatment 1 (2007), http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=57&type=123.
n6. "Good science" has been defined as "the faithful and rigorous adherence to the findings, the limitations,
and the conclusions of published, peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals." Robert A. Prentky et al.,
Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 357, 358 (2006). By
contrast, bad science has been defined as the "intentional or uninformed distortion, misinterpretation, or
selective reporting of findings from scientific articles." Id.
n7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
n8. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
n9. Technically, because the sex offender laws at issue in this Article are not criminal in nature, the
individuals are not criminal defendants, but civil respondents in most cases. The term defendant is used herein to
more easily identify the individual to which an SVP law is applied.
n10. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs of SVP laws.
n11. See Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and Employment
Restrictions, 40 Akron L. Rev. 339, 345 (2007) ("Sex and violence makes for a story line that sells.").
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n12. This is not the first time that a crackdown on sex offenders through legislation has occurred. In 1947, J.
Edgar Hoover, then director of the FBI, publicly declared that the "rapidly increasing" rate of sex crimes needed
to "be placed under the spotlight and its evils disclosed so that something may be done to correct a situation that
leaves maimed and murdered women lying in isolated areas, which leaves violated children in a state of hysteria,
and which is a perpetual nightmare to the loved ones and friends of the victims." Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual
Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & Just. 43, 53 (1998) (quoting J. Edgar Hoover, How Safe Is Your
Daughter? 144 Am. Mag. 32, 32 (1947)). For a history of the origin of twentieth century laws to detain sexual
psychopaths, see generally Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual
Psychopath Laws, 69 La. L. Rev. 549 (2009). The prior generation of sexual psychopath laws differed from
current civil commitment statutes in that the former required rehabilitative treatment in a mental health facility
in lieu of punitive incarceration. Dawn J. Post, Comment, Preventive Victimization: Assessing Future
Dangerousness in Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 Hamline J. Pub. L. &
Pol'y 177, 185 (1999). Most of the former laws were repealed in the 1970s when criminal justice policy
initiatives shifted away from rehabilitation models. Id.
n13. See Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-framing the Problem of Child Sexual
Abuse, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 142, 147-48 (2009) (discussing connection between media coverage and public
belief that there is "epidemic of sexual violence against children"); Meaghan Kelly, Lock them Up - And Throw
Away the Key: The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 Geo. J. Int'l L.
551, 553 (2008) (discussing "moral panic" surrounding sex offenders (quoting Anne-Marie McAlinden, The
Shaming of Sex Offenders: Risk, Retribution and Reintegration 18 (2007)); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice
Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 51, 60 (2008) (discussing how public
outrage over sex offenders has prompted congressional action); Bela August Walker, Essay, Deciphering Risk:
Sex Offender Statutes and Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. Balt. L. Rev. 183 , 184 (2010) (describing moral
panic surrounding sex crimes as "perpetual moral anxiety").
n14. Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt., Legislative Trends in Sex Offender Management 1 (2008), available at
http://www.csom.org/pubs/legislative_trends.pdf. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal
War on Sex Offenders, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435 (2010) (analogizing war against sex offenders to war on
drugs).
n15. E.g., Laura Crimaldi, Pols to Target Perv Law Loopholes: Bills Urge GPS, Parole for Life, Bos.
Herald, Feb. 24, 2008, at 4 (identifying specific cases of harm caused by released sex offenders and describing
forty bills then pending before Massachusetts state legislature that would impose more stringent restrictions on
sex offenders); Laura Mansnerus, Stoking "Moral Panic' Over Sex Offenders, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2005, at
14NJ-2 (describing media hype over sex offenders using Medicare payments to purchase Viagra and how horror
stories about pedophiles prompted legislative calls for stricter sex offender laws despite existence of other
important pending issues).
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n16. Chris Greer, Sex Crime and the Media: Sex Offending and the Press in a Divided Society 185-86
(2003); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 853, 887-88 (2011) (explaining that misconceptions about sex offenders stem from "stories of young
children who were sexually assaulted and killed by strangers").
n17. See e.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 2010)); Megan's Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-1-7-11 (West
2005 & Supp. 2010); Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and
Care Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.910 (2009); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary
Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2010) (contending that use of child
victim's name personalizes legislation and conveys sense of urgency); Wayne A. Logan, Megan's Laws as a
Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 371, 373-80 (2011) (discussing high-profile cases that have
influenced the enactment of sex offender legislation in the past three decades); Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex
Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 651, 676 (2008) (maintaining that sex offender
"policies are crafted in fearful haste, often as symbolic gestures to honor the crime victims whose suffering has
inspired them" (quoting Franklin E. Zimring, An American Travesty: Legal Responses to Adolescent Sexual
Offending xiii (2004))).
n18. Lisa L. Sample & Colleen Kadleck, Sex Offender Laws: Legislators' Accounts of the Need for Policy,
19 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 40, 57 (2008).
n19. Id. at 51 (quoting anonymous interviews of legislative officials).
n20. Michael R. Rand, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Victimization, 2008, at 2 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf.
n21. David Finkelhor et al., Crimes Against Children Research Ctr., Updated Trends in Child Maltreatment,
2008, at 1 fig.1 (2010), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV203_Updated%20Trends%20in
%20Child%20Maltreatment%202008_8-6-10.pdf (reporting statistics from the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System, which aggregates data from state child protection agencies).
n22. See Megan Magers et al., An Exploration of the Sex Offender Specialization and Violence Nexus, 6
SW. J. of Crim. Just. 133, 141 (2009) ("While the general public and policymakers typically view sex offenders
as persistent specialists and recidivists, the literature reviewed in this study and the findings from the present
study suggest that sex offenders engage in a variety of criminal behaviors and are a heterogeneous group of
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offenders."); Leonore M.J. Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 New
Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 387, 401 (1997) (concluding that there is "no evidence that child molesters
(or sex offenders in general) have higher recidivism rates or are in fact more dangerous than other types of
offenders").
n23. See Janus, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing how "predator archetype" hurts efforts to prevent sexual
violence); see also Janus & Polachek, supra note 13, at 145 (contending that society condemns sexual predators
for their internal characteristic that contaminates them).
n24. Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7
Analyses of Soc. Issues & Pub. Pol'y 137, 153-54 (2007); see also Ruth E. Mann et al., Assessing Risk for
Sexual Recidivism: Some Proposals on the Nature of Psychologically Meaningful Risk Factors, 22 Sexual
Abuse 191, 192 (2010) (citing studies supporting contentions that "the observed sexual recidivism rate of sexual
offenders is less than commonly believed" and "the overall recidivism rate of sexual offenders is lower than the
recidivism rate of other offender groups").
n25. Janus & Prentky, supra note 2, at 90; Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions
of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 301, 317-18 (2006).
n26. Compare 152 Cong. Rec. H5723 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (referring
to growing problem of online sexual predators) with Janis Wolak et al., Online "Predators" and Their Victims:
Myths, Realities, and Implications for Prevention and Treatment, 63 Am. Psychologist 111, 112-13, 119 (2008)
(reporting that public fears are erroneous since online predators are usually open about their sexual interest and
are rarely violent, suggesting that prevention may be better served by teaching young people safe internet
practices).
n27. As mandated by the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice created
the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, whose mission is
to "protect the public." About SMART, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,
Registering, and Tracking, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/about.htm (last visited June 21, 2011).
n28. See John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 31,
38-39 (2009) (noting that sex offenders are constructed as monsters and thus have few advocates); Lester, supra
note 11, at 347-48 (stating that sex offenders are abhorred even by other criminals).
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n29. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.21(3)(A) (West 2010) ("Repeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who
use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme
threat to the public safety. Sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their
offenses, and most sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and
are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. This makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society
at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant."); 140 Cong. Rec. H5612 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Dunn) (campaigning on congressional floor for registration and notification bill and claiming that rate of
recidivism of sex offenders is "astronomical. We know that."); 152 Cong. Rec. H5725 (daily ed. July 25, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Foley) (referring to sexual predators as "growing and dangerous threat to our children").
Representative Mark Foley, shortly after making this public statement, was caught in a scandal for sending
pornographic e-mails to teenage male pages and soon thereafter resigned. Ellen Goodman, You Can't Make This
Stuff Up: The Self-Proclaimed Party of Moral Values Can't Keep Its Own House in Order, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Oct. 6, 2006, at B-7.
n30. Other, though less common, laws specially designed for sex offenders include: bans on certain
employment, such as employment at day care facilities, Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8327 (2011); restrictions on
working near specified locations, such as schools, Ala. Code § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis 2011); GPS monitoring,
Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14(e) (2009), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 560.4(A) (2011); and chemical castration, Matthew V.
Daley, A Flawed Solution to the Sex Offender Situation in the United States: The Legality of Chemical
Castration for Sex Offenders, 5 Ind. Health L. Rev. 87 (2008) (listing statutes).
n31. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02 (2011).
n32. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
n33. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
n34. Id.
n35. Id. at 360-62.
n36. Id. at 361-63.
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n37. John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for Those Already Civilly
Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 81, 96 (2005).
n38. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1139-41 (D. Haw. 2008); see also Carpenter, supra
note 17, at 52 (arguing that Supreme Court's openness to describing civil commitment as civil in nature has led
legislators to take advantage by "imposing increasingly harsh regiments for the convicted sex offender,"
including registration and residency restrictions).
n39. Kathy Gookin, Wash. State Inst. for Pub. Policy, Comparison of State Laws Authorizing Involuntary
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: 2006 Update, Revised 1 (2007), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf. But see Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as
States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1-1 (reporting that approximately 2,700
sex offenders subject to civil commitment).
n40. Eric. S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders:
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1443, 1447 (2003) (finding only five percent
of committed offenders had been cleared for release).
n41. Amber Leigh Bagley, Comment, "An Era of Human Zoning": Banishing Sex Offenders from
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 Emory L.J. 1347, 1348 (2008).
n42. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-12(a)(16) (2009).
n43. Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications of Sex Offender Residency
Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1235, 1243 (2009).
n44. See Shawndra Jones, Note, Setting Their Record Straight: Granting Wrongly Branded Individuals
Relief from Sex Offender Registration, 41 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 479, 496-97 (2008) (explaining that
registries have deficient methods for ensuring accuracy).
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n45. Some courts, however, have overturned local regulations as preempted by state statute. See, e.g., Fross
v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 612 F.Supp.2d 651, 660 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (overturning Allegheny residency restriction
ordinance as preempted by state law).
n46. E.g., Ala. Code § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15(a)-(b) (2009); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 17.545(1) (West 2008); Okla. Stat. tit. 57 § 590(A) (2008).
n47. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (placing residency restrictions on certain
offenders that committed specified crimes against children); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§14:91.2(A)(1)-(4),
15:538(D)(1)(a)-(c) (2011) (placing residency restrictions on convicted sex offenders if their victim was "under
the age of thirteen years" and "whose offense involved a minor child").
n48. Lester, supra note 11, at 344-45 (discussing Alabama statute).
n49. Id. at 351-52 (noting that nineteen states have enacted these forms of residency restrictions).
n50. Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 Iowa L. Rev.
607, 621 (2009) (listing areas where sex offenders have been effectively banned from residing); Kari White,
Note, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency Restrictions as Modern-Day Banishment, 59 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 161, 168-69 (2008) (showing maps whereby officials highlighted few areas remaining where sex
offenders could reside after factoring in residency restrictions).
n51. See Lester, supra note 11, at 374-80 tbl.1 (listing statutes with information about geographic and
durational scope of restrictions).
n52. Council of State Gov'ts, Sex Offender Management Policy in the States: Strengthening Policy &
Practice 6 (2010), available at http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/SOMFinalReport-FINAL.pdf.
n53. The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 2006 (SORNA) may change this.
SORNA would require states, under penalty of losing certain funding, to follow a unitary system of sex offender
registration based not on individual assessments of future risk, but on the type of offense or conviction. Generic
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titles of offenses are categorized into three levels and the requisite amount of time to be registered is based on
the applicable level. Still, there is reason to believe that the SORNA requirements will not significantly overhaul
the registration system and entirely replace future dangerousness assessments. SORNA's registration
requirements were originally intended to be substantially implemented by states as of July 27, 2009. But, within
weeks of the deadline, few states had acted to implement the regulations because of its burden and cost and, with
pressure, the Attorney General delayed the deadline a year. News Release from Office of Sen. Patrick S. Leahy,
Sen. Leahy Applauds Extension for State Compliance with Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, U.S.
Fed News, June 3, 2009. As of July 27, 2011, only fourteen states had "substantially implemented" SORNA's
requirements. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Finds 24 Jurisdictions Have Substantially
Implemented SORNA requirements (July 28, 2011), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2011/SMART_ PR-072811.htm.
n54. See Lester, supra note 11, at 381-84 tbl.2 (listing statutes with punishment information); Ga. Code
Ann. § 42-1-15 (2008) (penalizing violation with up to thirty-year sentence).
n55. Caleb Durling, Comment, Never Going Home: Does It Make Us Safer? Does It Make Sense?: Sex
Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 317,
323 (2006).
n56. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). Cf. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto
Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to Procedural Nuisance, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 447, 454-58 (2011) (explaining
how legislatures and judiciaries circumvent valid ex post facto challenges to sex offender laws).
n57. See e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (starting with presumption that legislative
intent was to create civil non-punitive regulatory scheme); People v. LeRoy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 778-82 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005) (finding residency restrictions at issue to be civil, not punitive, and thus not an ex post facto law).
n58. See Lindsay A. Wagner, Comment, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: How Common Sense Places
Children at Risk, 1 Drexel L. Rev. 175, 176 (2009) (discussing trend toward retributive, punitive justifications
for punishment); see also Douard, supra note 28, at 46-47 (noting that conditions in which sex offenders serve
civil commitment are "extremely punitive" in nature); John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The
Inherent Overreaching in Sexually Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ.
Confinement 37, 61-62 (2009) (finding that sex offender civil commitment laws serve society's desires for
penance and just deserts).
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n59. Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 188
(2007).
n60. Yoav Sapir, Against Prevention? A Response to Harcourt's Against Prediction on Actuarial and
Clinical Predictions and the Faults of Incapacitation, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 253, 260-261 (2008) (book review).
n61. Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt., Recidivism of Sex Offenders 5 (2001) [hereinafter CSOM on
Recidivism], available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf.
n62. Patrick A. Langan et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released From Prison in
1994, at 1 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
n63. Id. at 24.
n64. Id.
n65. Id. at 2.
n66. Rhiana Kohl et al., Urban Inst., Massachusetts Recidivism Study: A Closer Look at Releases and
Returns to Prison 14 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411657_
massachusetts_recidivism.pdf.
n67. Id.
n68. See CSOM on Recidivism, supra note 61, at 1 (suggesting that if recidivism research shows that sex
offenders do not specialize in committing sex offenses, the public response for released sex offenders should be
no different than for released non-sex offenders); Tucker Culbertson, After Comstock: Equal Protection
Challenges to the Civil Commitment Provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 61
Page 36
83 Temp. L. Rev. 697, *756
Syracuse L. Rev. 427, 445-46 (2011) ("Though the federal government's interest in preventing sexual offenses is
compelling, [sex offender civil commitment] - as a means by which to pursue that interest - is irrational because
it is based on intense emotions, social stigma, and overbroad categorizations of "sexual' and "non-sexual'
behavior, rather than proven evidence. As such, it fails even the lowest form of equal protection review.").
n69. Geneva Adkins et al., Iowa Dep't of Human Rights, The Iowa Sex Offender Registry and Recidivism
4, 10 (2000), available at http://www.iowa.gov/dhr/cjjp/images/pdf/01_pub/SexOffender Report.pdf (defining
recidivism as reconviction with sample of over 400 sex offenders on parole or probation).
n70. Robert Barnoski, Wash. State Inst. for Pub. Policy, Sex Offender Sentencing in Washington State: Sex
Offender Risk Level Classification Tool and Recidivism 2 (2006), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-01-1204.pdf (defining recidivism as reconviction for a felony with a
sample of almost 700 released sex offenders).
n71. State of Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Servs., Report to the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission:
Sex Offenders 13-14 (2006) [hereinafter Ohio Commission], available at
http://www.publicsafety.ohio.gov/links/ocjs_SexOffenderR eport.pdf (defining recidivism as being
reincarcerated after release with an otherwise unidentified sample).
n72. Timothy Fortney et al., Myths and Facts about Sexual Offenders: Implications for Treatment and
Public Policy, 2 Sexual Offender Treatment 1, 4 (2007),
http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=55&type=123; see also Ohio Commission, supra note
71, at 13 (admitting "it is a common misperception that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate").
n73. One recent study reported sexual recidivism rates, approximately three years after release, of 5% for
rapists, 11% for incest offenders, 14% for extrafamilial child molesters, and 35% for non-contact offenders.
James Vess & Alex Skelton, Sexual and Violent Recidivism by Offender Type and Actuarial Risk: Reoffending
Rates for Rapists, Child Molesters and Mixed-Victim Offenders, 16 Psychol. Crime & L. 541, 542 (2010)
(citing D.L. Bartosh, et al., Differences in the Predictive Validity of Actuarial Risk Assessments in Relation to
Sex Offender Type, 47 Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 422 (2003)). As noted by Vess and
Skelton, the composition of a sex-offender recidivism study, in terms of the subgroups of offenders included in
the sample, is "perhaps the most salient factor contributing to the various recidivism rates" reported in the
literature. Id.
n74. See Langan et al., supra note 62, at 1 ("Released sex offenders with 1 prior arrest (the arrest for the sex
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crime for which they were imprisoned) had the lowest rearrest rate for a sex crime, about 3%; those with 2 or 3
prior arrests for some type of crime, 4%; 4 to 6 prior arrests, 6%; 7 to 10 prior arrests, 7%; and 11 to 15 prior
arrests, 8%.").
n75. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Comment, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 Calif. L.
Rev. 2093, 2108-22 (2010) (demonstrating that, while states purport to use civil commitment for treatment
purposes, civil commitment in fact harms the offender).
n76. Rand, supra note 20, at 5 tbl.6.
n77. Howard N. Snyder, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law
Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics 10 (2000), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf.
n78. Id. Strangers represent only about three percent of those who commit sexual assaults against victims
under the age of six. Id.
n79. See Rand, supra note 20, at 5 (reporting that, in 2008, sixty-three percent of reported rapes or sexual
assaults against women were committed by non-strangers).
n80. James Vess, Sex Offender Risk Assessment: Consideration of Human Rights in Community Protection
Legislation, 13 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 245, 246 (2008).
n81. See, e.g., Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan's Law on Sex Offender Reintegration,
21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 49, 54, 61 (2005) (reporting on study of 180+ registered sex offenders, half of whom
reported that information about them in state public registry was incorrect).
n82. Rachel Bandy, Measuring the Impact of Sex Offender Notification on Community Adoption of
Protective Behaviors, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol'y 237, 255-56 (2011) ("This study found no statistically
significant relationship between receiving notification about a high-risk sex offender and the adoption of
self-protective behaviors ... .").
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n83. Amy L. Anderson & Lisa L. Sample, Public Awareness and Action Resulting from Sex Offender
Community Notification Laws, 19 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 371, 388 (2008).
n84. Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State's Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 284, 297 (2008); see also Adkins et al.,
supra note 69, at 10 (finding no statistically significant difference between pre-registry and post-registry crime
rates for sex or non-sex offenses among released sex offenders); Barnoski, supra note 70, at 2-3 (finding that
level of risk classification of sex offenders and existence of notification program had no impact on recidivism
rates); Minn. Dep't of Corr., Residential Proximity & Sex Offense Recidivism in Minnesota 24 (2007), available
at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf (concluding after
tracking 224 sex offenders released between 1990 and 2002 who were later reincarcerated for a sex crime that
"not one of the 224 offenses would likely have been affected by residency restrictions"); Jeffery T. Walker et al.,
Ark. Crime Info. Ctr., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in the United States 15
(2004) (finding no "clear unidirectional conclusion as to whether sex offender notification laws prevent rapes");
Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Kevin S. Armstrong, Recidivism Rates for Registered and Nonregistered Juvenile
Sexual Offenders, 20 Sexual Abuse 393, 400 (2008) (reporting that in matched sample of 222 registered and
nonregistered juvenile offenders, the only two sex offenses occurred among registered group); Richard
Tewksbury & Wesley G. Jennings, Assessing the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification on Sex-Offending Trajectories, 37 Crim. Just. & Behav. 570, 579 (2010) (finding no impact of
registration and notification laws on recidivism rates among sample of released sex offenders); Bob Edward
Vasquez et al., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in the United States: A
Time-Series Analysis, 54 Crime & Delinq. 175, 188 (2008) (concluding that registration laws have had no
overall measurable or consistent effect on reports of rape).
n85. Ron Wilson, Geographic Research Suggests Offender Residency Laws May Not Work, Geography &
Pub. Safety, May 2009, at 11, 11, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/gps-bulletin-v2i1.pdf.
n86. Lester, supra note 11, at 359-60; see also Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended
Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531, 534 (2007)
("One of the most serious and far-reaching collateral consequences associated with sex offender registration is
the difficulty [registered sex offenders] experience in locating and maintaining safe, affordable, and legal
housing.")
n87. See Lester, supra note 11, at 359-62 (reviewing problems created and exacerbated by residency
restrictions on sex offenders, their families, communities, and police resources); Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine &
Richard Tewksbury, Residential Relegation of Registered Sex Offenders, 36 Am. J. Crim. Just. 44, 54-55 (2011)
(confirming that "registered sex offenders are relegated to socially disorganized, high crime communities" and
that, consequently, residential regulations have been "concentrating known sex offenders in neighborhoods with
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known child sexual assault victims"); Tewksbury, supra note 86, at 532-34 (citing empirical studies concerning
repercussions of registration and residency restrictions - including loss of friendship, employment, and
harassment - on various groups of offenders).
n88. 2 Barbara K. Schwartz & Henry R. Cellini, The Sex Offender: New Insights, Treatment Innovations
and Legal Developments xvii (1997).
n89. Christopher Uggen & Heather R. Hlavka, Does Stigmatizing Sex Offenders Drive Down Reporting
Rates? Perverse Effects and Unintended Consequences, 35 N. Ky. L. Rev. 347, 363 (2008).
n90. See Vitiello, supra note 17, at 685 (discussing how SVP laws may actually reduce willingness of
family members to report their sexual-offender relatives).
n91. See Amy Baron-Evans, Still Time to Rethink the Misguided Approach of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, 20 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 357, 358 (2008) (arguing that offender identities should
only be disclosed when disclosure will not implicitly identify victim).
n92. Gookin, supra note 39, at 1.
n93. Dan Gunderson, Corrections Officials Critical of Expanded Sex Offender Monitoring, Minn. Public
Radio (Feb. 22, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/02/16/gpstrac king/ (reporting that
Minnesota Department of Corrections' officials estimate that monitoring sex offenders "costs $ 20 per day for
each offender").
n94. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 4472 Children's Safety and Violent Crime
Reduction Act of 2005, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7061/hr4472.pdf.
n95. Cf. Janus, supra note 3, at 146-47 (arguing that while SVP laws serve expressive message rejecting
sexual violence, by highlighting most heinous sexual assaults by strangers they downplay more common types
of sexual violence).
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n96. CSOM on Recidivism, supra note 61, at 4.
n97. Some commentators have weighed the empirical flaws in actuarial predictions against the ability of
expert testimony to assist judges in making future-dangerousness assessments and have concluded that the
public health need to protect future victims justifies their use. Post, supra note 12, at 244-45.
n98. Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: A Survey
of Experts, 19 Sexual Abuse 425, 431 (2007); see also People v. Lopez, No. H029248, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 11573, at 5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2006) (noting that expert at trial relied upon mental health,
criminal, and hospital records, as well as reports by other evaluators and results of state-authorized instruments
for predicting sex offenses). As a general rule, the evidentiary ban on hearsay evidence is vitiated when it comes
to experts and the information they rely upon, at least to the extent that experts in their particular field
reasonable rely on that type of evidence. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 703.
n99. N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of Judges' Admissibility
Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 1, 13 (2009) (describing
result of authors' empirical study about influence of judge's decision to admit expert testimony on potential
jurors' acceptance of such testimony and concluding that if Daubert's intent was to limit junk science, judges
need to strongly embrace their gatekeeping role since study participants were more likely to value expert
testimony if judge admitted it because they believed judge independently acted and competently verified quality
of evidence provided by expert).
n100. Social sciences are those that use scientific methods in the study of humans as social creatures, such
as sociology, anthropology, psychology, criminology, political science, among others. Sarah H. Ramsey &
Robert F. Kelly, Social Science Knowledge in Family Law Cases: Judicial Gate-Keeping in the Daubert Era, 59
U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 6 (2004).
n101. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73
Va. L. Rev. 559, 582-83 (1987) (offering that recent uses of social science in law is uniquely about permitting
experts to use theory of human behavior to provide social framework to assist trier of fact in understanding
relevant issues while disabusing them of any myths they may have).
n102. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials 398 (6th ed. 2006)
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(referring to social science as providing empirical context for estimations of likelihood of future criminality).
n103. Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 867, 868-69 (2005).
n104. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence,
52 Md. L. Rev. 1, 75 (1993).
n105. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert
Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, § 2, at 481 (2001).
n106. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye expert offered evidence in the
form of results from an early version of a lie detector test to show the defendant's innocence. Id. at 1013.
n107. Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye's General Acceptance Standard for the
Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 861, 876 n.110 (2003) (quoting Harper v. State,
292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982)).
n108. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, art. VII, Rule 702, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937.
n109. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
n110. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
n111. Id. Subsequently, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court clarified that the same Daubert-led
standards applied to all expert testimony, including that based on skill or experience, not just of the scientific
variety. 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
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n112. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
n113. Id. at 597.
n114. Id. at 593-94.
n115. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
n116. Brodin, supra note 103, at 874-75.
n117. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
n118. Janus & Prentky, supra note 40, at 1462.
n119. See James Aaron George, Note, Offender Profiling and Expert Testimony: Scientifically Valid or
Glorified Results?, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 221, 233-35 (2008) (discussing how Daubert is broader than Frye, but but
that courts have applied it strictly).
n120. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999) ("The presence of Daubert's general
acceptance factor [does not] help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks
reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or
necromancy."); see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1845, 1854 (2003) (noting that inferences must
be derived from scientific method to qualify as scientific knowledge, and thus, astrology cannot be scientific
knowledge).
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n121. Lustre, supra note 105, at 481 ("Twenty-five states have affirmatively adopted the Daubert or similar
test for use in their courts, or had previously abandoned Frye and had developed a similar test; fifteen states and
the District of Columbia adhere to Frye; six states have not rejected Frye in toto but apply the Daubert factors;
and four states developed their own tests." (internal citations omitted) (capitalization omitted)).
n122. Id. at 520-36.
n123. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002) ("The trial judge
applies the Frye test only if the scientific principle, technique or test offered by the expert to support his or her
conclusion is "new' or "novel.'").
n124. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248-50 (Cal. 1976) (requiring testimony of general
acceptance from more than one source, and preferably from neutral party).
n125. Ratner v. McNeil-PPC, 898 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (citing Zito v. Zabarsky, 12
N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)). But see Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1078 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) (noting
that controversy in relevant scientific community about reliability and validity may lead to exclusion of expert
testimony).
n126. Andre A. Moenssens et al., Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases 12 (5th ed. 2007).
n127. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
n128. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 883 n.1.
n129. Id. at 884.
n130. Id. at 884-85.
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n131. Id.
n132. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The psychiatrist who
testified in the case was Dr. Grigson, nicknamed "Dr. Death," who became infamous for the frequency of his
testifying for the prosecution in Texas death penalty sentencing trials (testifying in over 150 death penalty cases
before retiring), and for the strength and eloquence of his testimony (usually about the unlikelihood of murderers
being rehabilitated). Hugh Aynesworth, Texas Dr. Death Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials: Felt Murderers
Would Kill Again, Wash. Times, Dec. 21, 2003, at A02. For example, in the instant case, Dr. Grigson testified
that there was a "one hundred percent and absolute" risk that Barefoot would commit violent crimes in the
future. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). (quoting trial
transcript). Despite not having ever examined Barefoot personally, Dr. Grigson declared - based on hypothetical
information matching Barefoot's case facts - that such a person would be a highly dangerous sociopath who
could not be cured. Id. at 917-19. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Id. at 919. Dr. Grigson was later
expelled by the APA for diagnosing mental illness without personally assessing the individual and for testifying
that he could predict with 100% accuracy the likelihood of violent recidivism. Laura Beil, Groups Expel
Psychiatrist Known for Murder Cases: Witness Nicknamed "Dr. Death' Says License to Practice Won't Be
Affected by Ethics Allegations, Dall. Morning News, July 26, 1995, at 21A.
n133. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 906.
n134. Id. at 899. There is some evidence that the majority may be right here. In a mock-juror design,
researchers concluded that jurors were much more likely to question an expert's testimony on future
dangerousness after it was subject to cross-examination or a competing expert's testimony. Daniel A. Krauss &
Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital
Sentencing, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 267, 302 (2001). Despite the cross-examination or competing expert's
testimony, however, the researchers still found that the mock jurors' assessment of the purported defendant's
future dangerousness was significantly influenced by the initial expert's testimony. Id. at 299-300.
n135. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899-901.
n136. Id. at 929.
n137. Id. at 935-36; see also Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
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Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 353, 361, 371 (2003) (discussing tension
between Barefoot and Daubert and arguing that Daubert's evidentiary standards should apply to expert testimony
on future dangerousness); Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing:
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 Law & Psychol. Rev. 63, 102-03
(2005) (maintaining that expert opinions on future dangerousness in capital cases are so unreliable that they lead
to arbitrary and capricious decisions).
n138. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.7.
n139. Id. at 897-98.
n140. Id. at 897.
n141. Id. at 899.
n142. The categorical approval of expert witness testimony on future dangerousness in capital cases was
cited with approval in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (approving prosecution's use of victim
impact statement in sentencing phase of capital trial). Cf. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 270-87 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (holding that while trial court in capital case erred by admitting insufficiently reliable expert
testimony on future dangerousness, admission amounted to harmless error).
n143. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 25, at 311-12.
n144. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
n145. Ford, 477 U.S. at 415 (citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899).
n146. Id.
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n147. Id. at 415 n.3.
n148. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84-85 (1985).
n149. Id. at 84.
n150. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 120, at 1847 (noting that clinical testimony regarding
future dangerousness is pervasive, and that "courts persist in circumventing any inquiry into the scientific
validity of expert future dangerousness predictions").
n151. E.g., Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 371-72.
n152. See, e.g., John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 Va. L. Rev. 391, 408-09 (2006) (claiming that, although actuarial risk assessment has
been known to be superior to clinical risk assessment for half a century, only recently have tools for predicting
violent behavior been developed and implemented).
n153. Fennel, supra note 58, at 52.
n154. See John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and
Violence 142 (2001) (making this conclusion with respect to propensity for violence).
n155. See Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L. Skeem, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific About
Being Dynamic, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 347, 352 (2005) (demonstrating how actuarial instruments use
mechanistic algorithm to combine heavily weighted static variables relevant to making ultimate determination of
risk).
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n156. Fennel, supra note 58, at 52.
n157. Fred S. Berlin et al., The Use of Actuarials at Civil Commitment Hearings to Predict the Likelihood
of Future Sexual Violence, 15 Sexual Abuse 377, 378 (2003). See generally Paralleling Behaviour: A Case
Formulation Approach to Offender Assessment and Intervention (Michael Daffern et al. eds., 2010).
n158. R. Karl Hanson, The Development of a Brief Actuarial Risk Scale for Sexual Offense Recidivism 14
(1997).
n159. Id. at 14-16.
n160. Id. at 4.
n161. Id.
n162. Id. at 18.
n163. Id. at 6.
n164. Id.
n165. Since the samples included no scores of 6, the experience table does not include separate risk
estimates for it. Id. at 13.
n166. Id. at 8, 10-11.
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n167. Id. at 16.
n168. See generally R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A
Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 Law & Hum. Behav. 119 (2000). The authors indicated they chose
the name STATIC-99 to highlight that the tool was developed in 1999 and includes only static factors. Id. at
122. STATIC-2002 is a newer instrument, in which the authors altered some of the original ten factors and
added factors involving juvenile sex offending, rate of sexual offending, young unrelated victims, community
supervision violations, and years free prior to index crime. Amy Phenix et al., Coding Rules for Static-2002, at
3-4 (2008), available at http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static2002codingrules.pdf. However, STATIC-99
remains the most used actuarial tool in sexual predator cases. Leslie Helmus et al., Reporting Static-99 in Light
of New Research on Recidivism Norms, The Forum, Winter 2009, at 38, 38. Indeed, few cases to date provide
any reference to STATIC-2002. Those cases that have referenced STATIC-2002 have generally reported
STATIC-99 scores as well. E.g., United States v. Hunt, 643 F. Supp. 2d 161, 172-73 (D. Mass. 2009); People v.
Sims, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5820, at 4 (Ct. App. Cal. July 26, 2010); People v. Zavala, 2010 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 5544, at 4-5 (Ct. App. Cal. July 15, 2010).
n169. R. Karl Hanson et al., Predicting Recidivism Amongst Sexual Offenders: A Multi-Site Study of
Static-2002, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 198, 198 (2010).
n170. Andrew Harris et al., STATIC-99 Coding Rules Revised 3 (2003), available at
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2003-03-stc-cde-eng.pdf; Hanson & Thornton, supra note 168, at
121-22.
n171. Harris et al., supra note 170, at 67.
n172. Id.
n173. Id. at 69. "Experience rate" is a term the developers use for the recidivism statistics observed in the
developmental samples.
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n174. Id.
n175. Id.
n176. Id. These numbers are from the original STATIC-99 forms. The authors recently (October 2008)
updated the tables because of their recognition that recidivism numbers have generally dropped. However, the
newer tables have been criticized for not being cross-validated or peer reviewed. See generally Brian R. Abbott,
Applicability of the New Static-99 Experience Tables in Sexually Violent Predator Risk Assessments, 4 Sexual
Offender Treatment 1 (2009), http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=73&type=123.
n177. See Harris et al., supra note 170, at 4-5 (demonstrating how data can be collected through official
reports, collateral sources, or self-reporting depending on nature of data being collected).
n178. Id. at 5.
n179. Id.
n180. Stephen D. Hart, Actuarial Risk Assessment: Commentary on Berlin et al., 15 Sexual Abuse 383, 385
(2003) (describing this as argument by analogy).
n181. Berlin et al., supra note 157, at 380-81.
n182. See generally Reinhard Eher et al., Failure of Static-99 and SORAG to Predict Relevant Reoffense
Categories in Relevant Sexual Offender Subtypes: A Prospective Study, 3 Sexual Offender Treatment 1 (2008),
http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=65&type=123; Grant T. Harris et al., A Multisite
Comparison of Actuarial Risk Instruments for Sex Offenders, 15 Psychol. Assessment 413 (2003); Jan Looman,
Comparison of Two Risk Assessment Instruments for Sexual Offenders, 18 Sexual Abuse 193 (2006).
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n183. Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the "Margins
of Error' of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 Brit. J. Psychiatry (supp. 49) s60, s60 (2007)
(discussing flaws with actuarial risk assessment instruments in general).
n184. See Leam A. Craig et al., Assessing Risk in Sex Offenders: A Practitioner's Guide 55 (2008)
(indicating that most predictive algorithms use only static factors).
n185. See Douglas & Skeem, supra note 155, at 357-59 (discussing these dynamic risk factors with respect
to risk of future violence).
n186. Id. at 348; Andrew John Rawson Harris & R. Karl Hanson, Clinical, Actuarial and Dynamic Risk
Assessment of Sexual Offenders: Why Do Things Keep Changing?, 16 J. Sexual Aggression 296, 300-01
(2010); John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life: Sexual Offender Risk
Assessment - Part Two, Champion, Mar. 2009, at 32, 37.
n187. See Jackson & Hess, supra note 98, at 434 (noting that 95.1% of responding experts reported using
actuarial risk assessments "always or most of the time").
n188. Janus & Prentky, supra note 40, at 1497.
n189. Daniel C. Murrie et al., Rater (Dis)Agreement on Risk Assessment Measures in Sexually Violent
Predator Proceedings: Evidence of Adversarial Allegiance in Forensic Evaluation?, 15 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L.
19, 21 (2009).
n190. Cal. Penal Code § 290.04(b) (West 2010) (requiring STATIC-99 for risk assessment of male
offenders unless and until designated committee chooses alternative actuarial tool); Va. Code Ann. §
37.2-903(B)-(C) (2009) (requiring STATIC-99 score of five, but four if offense involved minor under age of
thirteen; alternatively permitting clinical assessment if state officials believe no scientific actuarial instrument is
available). Two Virginia Supreme Court justices warned that this requirement will "encourage a battle between
expert witnesses with regard to whether an inmate received "a correctly computed score.'" Miles v.
Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 924, 925 (Va. 2007) (Kinser and Lemon, J.J., concurring).
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n191. See Steve Erickson, The Ethics of SVP Evaluations, Crime & Consequence, Oct. 7, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 20072402 (noting argument of many psychologists that "we don't know that much about sexual
recidivism with the level of precision necessary to justify civil commitment"); Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 371
(noting that future is inherently unknowable).
n192. Id. at 360.
n193. Id.
n194. Am. Acad. of Psychiatry & the Law, Ethics Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry 3
(2005); Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Ethics Primer 69 (2001).
n195. This Article's focus upon a social science does not mean that there are not similar issues with experts
in the hard sciences. For instance, in the 2008 Annual Review of Law and Social Science, experts who have
worked with issues on science in the law for years summarized:
It has been suggested that over the decades forensic examiners have been pressured to make statements as
extreme as they can get - 100% certainty, zero error rates, identification to the exclusion of all others in the
world - not because such statements grow out of their science, but because they serve the needs of those who use
their work.
Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might
Yet Find It, 4 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 149, 159 (2008). Further, these experts observe that judges tend to be
inclined to permit the evidence despite more current knowledge raising doubts about its validity and reliability
because of tradition and deference to prior appellate decisions. Id. at 153.
n196. Abbott, supra note 176, at 10.
n197. Hanson, supra note 158, at 7-10; R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, STATIC-99: Improving
Actuarial Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders 6-8 (1999), http://www.courtdiagnostic.com/Static%2099-02.pdf.
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n198. See Hanson, supra note 158, at 7-10 (indicating over half of sex offenders in the samples for
RRASOR were released from maximum security facilities, psychiatric inpatient treatment, or were referred for
treatment at maximum-security mental-health facilities); Hanson & Thornton, supra note 197, at 6-8 (noting that
a majority of STATIC-99 developmental samples were derived from populations released from maximum
security and psychiatric treatment facilities in England and Canada).
n199. Id. at 10.
n200. Id. at 13.
n201. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating that courts should consider
"known or potential rates of error").
n202. Abbott, supra note 176, at 9.
n203. Hart et al., supra note 183, at s62.
n204. Id.
n205. Cf. R. Karl Hanson & Phillip D. Howard, Commentary, Individual Confidence Intervals Do Not
Inform Decision-Makers About the Accuracy of Risk Assessment Evaluations, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 275, 275
(2010) ("Individual confidence intervals provide little information concerning the accuracy of a risk assessment.
When the outcome is dichotomous, the confidence intervals for recidivism prediction will almost always range
from zero to one (i.e., be uninformative). Consequently, other indicators of predictive accuracy are needed,
many of which are non-quantitative.").
n206. David DeMatteo & John F. Edens, The Role and Relevance of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in
Court: A Case Law Survey of U.S. Courts (1991-2004), 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 214, 215 (2006).
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n207. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 168, at 121.
n208. Id. at 126 tbl.4.
n209. Id.
n210. See Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 79-80 (2d ed. 1988)
(characterizing r=.10 as low, r=.30 as medium, and r=.50 as high).
n211. See Berlin et al., supra note 157, at 379 (explaining that correlation coefficient of .13 between
RRASOR score and recidivism rate means that only two percent of variance in recidivism rate can be attributed
to factors measured by RRASOR).
n212. Id. at 381.
n213. Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in
Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness 107 (2007).
n214. Harris et al., supra 182, at 413.
n215. Slobogin, supra note 213, at 107.
n216. R. Karl Hanson & Kelly Morton-Bourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated
Meta-Analysis 32 (2004).
n217. R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments for
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Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis 31 (2007).
n218. Id.
n219. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 168, at 126.
n220. Howard E. Barbaree et al., Evaluating the Predictive Accuracy of Six Risk Assessment Instruments
for Adult Sex Offenders, 28 Crim. Just. & Behav. 490, 510 (2001).
n221. Fennel, supra note 58, at 54.
n222. Id.
n223. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 168, at 125.
n224. Fennel, supra note 58, at 59-61.
n225. See R. Karl Hanson et al., Predicting Recidivism Amongst Sexual Offenders: A Multi-site Study of
STATIC-2002, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 198, 198-99 (2010) ("More complex risk assessment systems are
available that may be more accurate than STATIC-99 for predicting sexual recidivism and violent recidivism ...
.").
n226. Helmus et al., supra note 168, at 39.
n227. R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments for
Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 21 Psychol. Assessment 1, 4, 6 (2009).
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n228. Helmus et al., supra note 168, at 2; see also Leslie Helmus, Re-Norming Static-99 Recidivism
Estimates: Exploring Base Rate Variability Across Sex Offender Samples 67 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Carleton University), available at
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/helmus2009-09static-99normsmathesis.pdf (combining multiple studies and
finding base rate of 60% of original STATIC-99 developmental samples).
n229. Abbott et al., supra note 176, at 1; see also David Thornton et al., Moving Beyond the Standard
Model for Actuarial Assessment for Sexual Offenders, The Forum, Summer 2010, at 17, 18-19 (acknowledging
that previous tables were unreliable).
n230. Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 373.
n231. Id. at 373-74.
n232. See Eher et al., supra note 182, at 8 (testing STATIC-99 on child sexual abusers and rapists);
Looman, supra note 182, at 193 (finding variances of STATIC-99 on treated high-risk offenders); see also
Abbott, supra note 176, at 6 (citing additional studies showing subgroup differences); R. Karl Hanson, Does
STATIC-99 Predict Recidivism in Older Sexual Offenders?, 18 Sexual Abuse 343, at 344 (2006) (finding base
rate of 2% in 5 years for over age 60, compared to 15% for under age 40).
n233. FBI, Crime in the United States: By Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2006-2007, FBI.GOV,
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_04_dd.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
n234. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 227, at 7; see also Hanson et al., supra note 169, at 203
(comparing samples and finding U.S.-based sample had lowest ROC of .61 compared to samples in Canada and
United Kingdom).
n235. Fennel, supra note 58, at 59 (maintaining that Canada's sexual assault rates are more than twice that of
United States).
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n236. Leam A. Craig et al., Limitations in Actuarial Risk Assessment of Sexual Offenders: A
Methodological Note, Brit. J. Forensic Prac., Feb. 2004, at 16, 18.
n237. Craig et al., supra note 184, at 41 (providing formula for result).
n238. Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 374.
n239. Eher et al., supra note 182, at 41, 42. See generally Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent
Predators: Continued Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 New Crim. L. Rev. 213, 236-49 (2011) (demonstrating that
significant amount of false positives result from use of STATIC-99).
n240. Peter R. Jones et al., Risk Classification and Juvenile Dispositions: What Is the State of the Art?, 79
Temp. L. Rev. 461, 495 (2006).
n241. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for
Intellectual Due Process 38-39 (2007) ("Regardless of whether the scientific method exists in practice, people -
scientists and nonscientists alike - frame their arguments as though it does."); Tom Jagtenberg, The Social
Construction of Science: A Comparative Study of Goal Direction, Research Evolution and Legitimation 12-40
(1983) (arguing that science is socially constructed through goal-oriented behavior of researchers and that its
accreditation is negotiated).
n242. Richard Wollert, Low Base Rates Limit Expert Certainty When Current Actuarials Are Used to
Identify Sexually Violent Predators: An Application of Bayes's Theorem, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 56, 58
(2006).
n243. Harris et al., supra note 182, at 416; see also Barbaree et al., supra note 220, at 499 (reporting
correlation coefficients for interrater reliability of .94 for RRASOR and .90 for STATIC-99).
n244. Murrie et al., supra note 189, at 39.
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n245. Id. at 40 (cautioning that these results are not definitive to show litigant bias).
n246. Douglas P. Boer, Ethical and Practical Concerns Regarding the Current Status of Sex Offender Risk
Assessment, 3 Sexual Offender Treatment 1, 3 (2008),
http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=64&type=123.
n247. Pamela R. Blair et al., Is There an Allegiance Effect for Assessment Instruments? Actuarial Risk
Assessment as an Exemplar, 15 Clinical Psychol.: Sci. & Prac. 346, 354 (2008).
n248. Id. at 353.
n249. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 227, at 7.
n250. Harris et al., supra note 170, at 3.
n251. See infra Part V for a discussion of cases addressing the use of actuarial instruments in court.
n252. Douglas Mossman, Another Look at Interpreting Risk Categories, 18 Sexual Abuse 41, 60-61 (2006);
Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Predicting the Likelihood of Future Sexual Recidivism: Pilot Study Findings from a
California Sex Offender Risk Project and Cross-Validation of the Static-99, 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L.
454, 466 (2007); see also Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Alice in Actuarial-Land: Through the Looking Glass of
Changing Static-99 Norms, 38 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 400, 405 (2010) ("Although they purport to be
empirically based, the current Static-99 ... violates the basic tenets of evidence-based medicine that require
reasoned, not mechanical, application of group findings to the individual. Two core elements must be present to
apply an actuarial risk model to a specific individual: sample representativeness and uniform measurement of
outcome. Both of these elements are lacking in Static-99 ... research reviews. Thus, a call for caution must be
sounded when using these tools to make weighty decisions involving an individual's liberty and the protection of
public safety.").
n253. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 12-13,
United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-50393).
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n254. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Assessing the Risk for Violence: Position Statement (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDo
cumentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200109.aspx.
n255. E.g., Hart, supra note 180, at 385-86; Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 360; Scott I. Vrieze & William
M. Grove, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism. I. Correcting for Item Overselection and Accuracy
Overestimation in Scale Development. II. Sampling Error-Induced Attenuation of Predictive Validity Over Base
Rate Information, 32 L. & Hum. Behav. 266, 276 (2008); Wollert, supra note 242, at 72-73. See generally Boer,
supra note 246, at 2 (arguing that only thing risk researchers agree upon is general description of types of risk
assessments, such as clinical, actuarial, and structured professional judgments).
n256. Wollert, supra note 242, at 78-80.
n257. John Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 13-16 (1981) (contending that extreme
deprivation of liberty that civil commitment causes raises spectre of ethical concerns for psychologists and
psychiatrists participating in legal system); Boer, supra note 246, at 3-4; Charles P. Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the
Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing
Proceedings, 8 Am. J. L. & Med. 407, 418 (1983); Hart et al., supra note 183, at 64; Prentky et al., supra note 6,
at 383.
n258. Theodore Donaldson & Richard Wollert, A Mathematical Proof and Example That Bayes's Theorem
Is Fundamental to Actuarial Estimates of Sexual Recidivism Risk, 20 Sexual Abuse 206, 213-15 (2008).
n259. Berlin et al., supra note 157, at 382; see also Eher et al., supra note 182, at 10-12 (stating that even if
instruments are statically confirmed as better than chance, their practical value in legal settings should be
questioned).
n260. See David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of Diagnostic Precision and Predictive Utility in
the Individual Case: A Challenge for Forensic Practice, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 259, 269-72 (2010) (discussing
errors that may arise when extrapolating from group statistics for purpose of assessing a particular individual's
future behavior).
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n261. Janus & Prentky, supra note 2, at 92.
n262. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 25, at 306.
n263. E.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Therrian, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 415, 420 (Ct. App. 2003); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 238 (Ct. App. 2000;
People v. Langhorne, No. H027495, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11150, at 48 (Dec. 1, 2005); In re Girard,
No. 103,404, 2011 Kan. App. LEXIS 103, at 3 (June 24, 2011).
n264. Fields, 35 P.3d at 88; Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 207-08 (Ct. App. 1999).
n265. Fields, 35 P.3d at 89; see also People v. Miller, No. E035921, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3130, at
15 (Apr. 6, 2005) (stating that expert's testimony about using RRASOR and STATIC-99 "did not carry a
misleading aura of infallibility").
n266. See, e.g., People v. Castillo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2009) (describing state expert as
"applying the scientifically validated "Static-99' analysis to predict the likelihood that Castillo would commit
future sex offenses"); In re Civil Commitment of J.Z.M., No. A-0940-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1343, at 8 (Mar. 6, 2008) (describing STATIC-99 as "well-validated actuarial instrument").
n267. Garcetti, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
n268. Ortega-Mantilla v. Florida, 898 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 2005); Lee v. State, 854 So. 2d 709, 712
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1196 (Ill. 2004); In re Commitment
of R.S., 801 A.2d 219, 220 (N.J. 2002); In re Det. of Rudolph, No. 48744-2-I, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 1203, at 4
n.2 (June 14, 2004); see also In re Det. of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).
n269. State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); see also In re Commitment of J.P., 772
A.2d 54, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding actuarial test invalid as applied to juveniles).
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n270. E.g., Ortega-Mantilla, 898 So. 2d at 1168; Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1193.
n271. Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1192.
n272. Id. at 1193.
n273. Id. (citing Roeling v. State, 880 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
n274. See Roeling, 880 So.2d at 1239 (citing, for example, four articles by Karl Hanson, the developer of
STATIC-99).
n275. No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2008).
n276. Shields, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837, at 1-3 (basing decision solely upon precedent of Simons).
n277. In re Goddard, 144 S.W.3d 848, 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
n278. In re Det. of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (noting that, based on its review of
case law from other jurisdictions, it concurred with assessment of New Jersey court that "no state appellate court
decision ... has found actuarial instruments inadmissible at SVP proceedings" (quoting In re Commitment of
R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.Div. 2001) (internal quotation mark omitted)), cited in In re Det. of
Shearer, No. 5-858/05-0048, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 24, at 9-10 (Jan. 19, 2006).
n279. See, e.g., R.S., 773 A.2d at 90 (concluding that since Barefoot accepted reliability of clinical judgment
as to future dangerousness, then actuarial evidence must also be admissible).
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n280. State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 87-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (observing inconsistency
between Barefoot and Daubert/Kumho, but finding actuarial evidence admissible on other grounds).
n281. People v. Litmon, No. H021538, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 8195, at 56-57 (August 6, 2002); In re Det. of
Hauge, 812 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Girard, No. 103505, 2011 Kan. App. LEXIS 103, at 7
(June 24, 2011); In re Det. of Davenport, No. 23545-9-III, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 1799, at 32 (Aug. 5, 2010);
In re Det. of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 725 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
n282. Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at 51-52 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3,
2008); In re Commitment of Field, 813 N.E.2d 319, 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
n283. People v. Clotfelter, No. C038351, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 8921, at 33 (Sept. 25, 2002).
n284. In re P.F., 712 N.W.2d 610, 616 (N.D. 2006).
n285. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Altenbernd,
C.J., concurring) (arguing that predicting future human behavior is likely novel and that relevant scientific
community for assessing general acceptance of actuarial tests should be comprised of more than small set of
professionals who profit from them); Lee v. State, 854 So. 2d 709, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Casanueva, J.,
concurring) ("Unfortunately, the existing actuarial tools do not seem to address all relevant static risk factors.");
Girard, 2011 Kan. App. LEXIS 103, at 7 (Malone, J., concurring) (noting that actuarial test should be subject to
Frye testing but that defendant had not challenged on appeal); In re G.R.H., 2011 N.D. 21, 25 (Kapsner, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that actuarial instruments cannot reliably predict an individual's risk); In re Anderson,
730 N.W.2d 570, 583-90 (N.D. 2007) (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (analyzing empirical literature about STATIC-99
and criticizing use of actuarial assessments). Cf. United States v. C.R., No. 09-CR-155, 2011 WL 1901645, at 84
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2011) ("Use of these tests [including STATIC-99] on an individual who has never been
charged or convicted of a hand-on sexual offense is highly controversial; the court finds their use unacceptable
because it is contrary to acceptable scientific usage in the present case.").
n286. Lee, 854 So. 2d at 717 (Casanueva, J., concurring).
n287. Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1119-20 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring).
Page 62
83 Temp. L. Rev. 697, *756
n288. In re Murrell, 215 S.W.3d 96, 115-17 (Mo. 2007) (Wolf, C.J., dissenting).
n289. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 730 N.W.2d 570, 583-90 (N.D. 2007) (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (providing
citations to peer-reviewed studies and lamenting uncritical use of actuarial assessments which have become
substitutes for judicial judgments); In re Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 115-16 (Wolf, C.J., dissenting) (analyzing
methodology and mechanics of STATIC-99 and referencing publication regarding actuarial assessments); see
also Burton, 884 So. 2d at 1119-20 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring) (discussing generally the issue of potential
false positives for RRASOR). But see State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (reviewing
empirical faults of STATIC-99 and ruling it inadmissible per Frye to inform factual finding of mental
abnormality).
n290. 512 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2008).
n291. McIlrath, 512 F.3d at 424.
n292. Id.
n293. Id. at 425.
n294. See id. (citing Janus & Prentky, supra note 40, at 1455-58).
n295. In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1194 (Ill. 2004).
n296. Commonwealth v. Parks, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 225, at 12 (Mar. 9, 2005) (citing Commonwealth
v. McGruder, 205 N.E.2d 726 (Mass. 1965)).
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n297. People v. Ward, 71 Cal. App. 4th 368, 374 (1999), quoted in Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100,
1108 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Carmony v. Hunter, No. CIV S-03-0927 DFL JFM P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92099, at
51 (E.D. Cal. 2006); People v. Meyers, No. C042511, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 4872, at 10-11 (June 2, 2005).
n298. No. PM 04-3211, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 187 (Dec. 18, 2006).
n299. Nichols, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 187, at 3.
n300. Id. at 5-6.
n301. Id. at 8.
n302. Id.
n303. Id. at 9.
n304. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701(7)(b) (2010); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6, § 178C (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6403(a)(3) (2010); S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (2009); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a)(2) (2007); Va. Code Ann.
37.2-900 (2005 & Supp. 2010).
n305. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 632.480(5) (West 2011).
n306. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 207/15(b)(5) (West 2006). Wisconsin's legislature changed its standard
from "substantially probable" to "likely." Wis. Stat. § 980.01 (2010), amended by S.B. 441, 2003 Leg. (Wisc.
2004).
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n307. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02 Subd. 18b. (West 2011).
n308. Iowa Code Ann. § 229A.2(4) (West 2011); Wis. Stat. § 980.01(1m) (2010).
n309. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.912(4) (West 2008); Kansas Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(c) (2008); see also Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 83-174.01(2) (2008) (containing slight variation from cited definition); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
135-E:2(VI) (2010) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2008) (same).
n310. See generally Abbott, supra note 176, at 18 (defining "more likely than not" as greater than fifty
percent chance of reoffending).
n311. Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 670-71 (Cal. 2002).
n312. Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 800 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
n313. Erickson, supra note 191.
n314. Id.
n315. Fennel, supra note 58, at 39-40. Fennel cites Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside
America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 62 (2006) (referring to then Vice-President Dick Cheney's stance
that preventive measures are justifiable if there is even a one percent chance of a security threat) and George G.
Woodworth & Joseph B. Kadane, Expert Testimony Supporting Post-Sentence Civil Incarceration of Violent
Sexual Offenders, 3 L. Probability & Risk 221, 227 (2004) (arguing that language in state SVP statutes requires
risk levels "substantially above 50%").
n316. Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch.6 § 178K (West 2010); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-509 (2009); N.Y. Correct.
Law § 168-l(6) (McKinney 2011); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 582.5(c) (West 2011).
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n317. In re Det. of Ewoldt, 634 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa 2001).
n318. Id.; see also In re Det. of Pierce, 748 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa 2008) (determining that state need not
show immediate risk, so measures of lifetime risk were acceptable).
n319. In re Murrell, 215 S.W.3d 96, 104-05 (Mo. 2007) (en banc); cf. Beasley v. Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 600
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (construing state statute language "menace" as "a threat or imminent danger").
n320. See, e.g., In re Det. of Wilson, No. 7-832/ 06-1625, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1333, at 5 (Dec. 28, 2007)
(contending that while civil commitment requires assessment of likelihood of reoffending at time of
commitment, actuarial estimates of future risk remain relevant to that question).
n321. No. A-1451-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 627 (March 11, 2008).
n322. K.S., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 627, at 6-7, 10.
n323. Id. at 1-3, 9-10.
n324. E.g., In re Rush, 766 N.W.2d 720, 723 (N.D. 2009); People v. Deberry, No. D047707, D049686, 2008
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11, at 8 n.3 (Jan. 2, 2008); Wilson, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1333, at 2; Murrell, 215
S.W.3d at 109; In re Det. of Harless, No. 6-1017/06-0033, 2007 Iowa. App. LEXIS 66, at 6 (Jan. 31, 2007); In re
G.R.H., 758 N.W.2d 719, 723 (N.D. 2008); People v. Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 417 (Ct. App. 2003); In re
Commitment of Lalor, 661 N.W.2d 898, 903-04 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). But see Commonwealth v. Squire, 685
S.E.2d 631, 633 (Va. 2009) (upholding trial court's determination that defendant was not likely to reoffend
despite STATIC-99's 52% risk percentage where there was no evidence of any reoffending during prior ten
years).
n325. E.g., Wilson, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1333, at 6; Harless, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 66, at 11; Murrell,
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215 S.W.3d at 103, 113; In re Det. of Taylor, 134 P.3d 254, 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
n326. Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 659 (Cal. 2002) (quoting testimony of licensed psychologist
regarding STATIC-99 data).
n327. People v. Flores, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570-71, 573 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting prosecutor's expert)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
n328. See State v. Dyer, No. L-06-1357, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4351, at 11 (Sept. 21, 2007) (stating lower
court was heavily influenced by state experts' agreement on high STATIC-99 scores in SVP status case); State v.
Twiggs, No. 88142, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1192, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2007) (acknowledging lower court's belief that
STATIC-99 score was "most clear and convincing evidence" to establish sexual predator status); State v. Butler,
No. 86554, Ohio App. LEXIS 4412, at 9 (Aug. 31, 2006) (indicating that STATIC-99 score correlating to 52%
risk "weighed heavily" in lower court's determination of sexual predator status).
n329. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 228 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting state expert
derived fifty-two percent score from STATIC-99 and then added five percentage points based on other risk
factors), rev'd on other grounds, Cooley, 57 P.3d at 673-74; Commonwealth v. Cowen, 897 N.E.2d 586, 590 n.3
(Mass. 2008) (describing testimony by experts that STATIC-99 scores may be "adjusted upwards or downwards
depending on risk factors").
n330. E.g., United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236 (D. Mass. 2009); People v. Stewart, No.
C037873, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4207, at 8 (Apr. 29, 2003); People v. Pacini, No. H022565, 2003 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 325, at 33-34 (Jan. 10, 2003).
n331. People v. Langhorne, No. H027495, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11150, at 13 (Dec. 1, 2005).
n332. Hart et al., supra note 183, at s64.
n333. Prentky et al., supra note 6, at 380.
Page 67
83 Temp. L. Rev. 697, *756
n334. See infra notes 334-37, 350-52, and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where courts have
upheld sex offender status despite actuarial-based risk estimates below fifty percent.
n335. 773 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
n336. Pedroza, 773 So. 2d at 640 n.3.
n337. Id. at 643. (W. Sharp, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
n338. E.g., In re Det. of Cain, 931 N.E.2d 337, 339-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); People v. Avila, No. B193902,
2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6125, at 23 (July 28, 2008); People v. Wallace, No. H027890, 2006 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1039, at 4-5 (Feb. 2, 2006); People v. Jackson, No. A100091, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2390, at 7-8 (Mar. 16, 2004); In re Commitment of Field, 813 N.E.2d 319, 322, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re
Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 81-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
n339. R.S., 773 A.2d at 82. In accord with this statement, the defense argued that these actuarial tools may
be unethical. Id. at 91-94.
n340. People v. Stewart, No. C037873, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4207, at 9 (Apr. 29, 2003).
n341. E.g., Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DMC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71127, at 22-23 (D.N.J. Sept. 3,
2008); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp.2d 1145, 1155 (D. Haw. 2008); People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr.
3d 661, 688-89 n.23-25 (Ct. App. 2008); Kilgore v. Hurst, No. L03-2611, 64 Va. Cir. 376, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS
178, at 7-8 (Apr. 20, 2004); In re Mental Commitment of Good, No. 2007AP279, 2008 WI App 17, P 7, 2007
WL 4390443, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007).
n342. People v. Rose, No. H030534, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10017, at 7-8 (Dec. 12, 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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n343. People v. Torres, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597, 600 (Ct. App. 2002).
n344. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 704(a).
n345. In re Civil Commitment of Stringer, No. A05-2240, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 831, at 10 (Aug.
1, 2006).
n346. State v. Bieck, No. 2003-CA-66, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3223, at 25 (July 2, 2004).
n347. State v. Mruk, No. L-04-1213, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 532, at 4-5 (Feb. 10, 2006); In re Det. of
Savala, No. 20658-1-III, 2004 Wash. App. Lexis 1443, at 10 (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 2004).
n348. In re Civil Commitment of Rustman, No. A06-266, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 683, at 6 (June 27,
2006).
n349. In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Ill. 2004).
n350. State v. Carter, No. 88380, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2476, at 8 (May 31, 2007).
n351. E.g., In re A.B., 334 S.W.3d 746, 753-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
n352. People v. Williams, No. A100942, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11678, at 15 (Dec. 15, 2003); A.B.,
334 S.W.3d at 753-54.
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n353. E.g., People v. Castillo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Det. of Pierce, 748 N.W.2d
509, 513-14 (Iowa 2008); People v. Jackson, No. A100091, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2390, at 6-7 (Mar.
16, 2004); People v. Pacini, No. H022565, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 325, at 29-30 (Jan. 10, 2003); see also
Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 224, 231 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting state expert's testimony that
STATIC-99 reflected "minimum potential for reoffense").
n354. See Huftile v. Hunter, No. CIV S-05-0174, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5311, at 15-16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
2009) (discussing state expert's testimony that STATIC-99 score does not consider possible offenses - only
convictions - and therefore may not consider all of defendant's predatory acts); People v. Orozco, No. B199439,
2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7697, at 10 (Sept. 30, 2008) (discussing expert testimony that STATIC-99
underestimates because it considers only convictions, rather than offenses which may go unreported).
n355. See Hanson & Thornton, supra note 168, at 122-23 tbl.2 (including and differentiating convictions
from charges/readmissions in recidivism criteria).
n356. In re Det. of Shearer, No. 5-858/05-0048, 2006 Iowa App.LEXIS 34, at 11 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19,
2006).
n357. In re Civil Commitment of Luhmann, No. A07-912, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 890, at 10 (Aug.
28, 2007). The testifying expert also noted that defendant's high scores for likelihood to reoffend were supported
by his socioeconomic status among other factors. Id.
n358. 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661 (Ct. App. 2008).
n359. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 688 n.23; see also In re Hehn, 745 N.W.2d 631, 632-33 (N.D. 2008)
(noting that one of two state experts declined to apply RRASOR and STATIC-99 because she believed they
were "spuriously low" in defendant's case since they did not account for allegations against defendant).
n360. People v. Langhorne, No. H027495, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11150, at 17 (Dec. 1, 2005).
n361. See, e.g., People v. Clotfelter, No. C038351, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8921, at 24-26 (Sept. 25,
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2002) (noting state expert's testimony that STATIC-99 has "shortcomings," including propensity to
underestimate risk of defendant reoffending, largely because it does not account for factors relevant to
recidivism); cf. In re Care and Treatment of Burgess, 147 S.W.3d 822, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (noting state
expert's argument that "more likely than not" standard was met despite actuarial results far less than 50% based
on defendant's failure to participate in treatment or reassessment, among other factors).
n362. See, e.g., Hehn, 745 N.W.2d at 636 ("We have previously made clear that we will not engage in a
"contest over percentage points' when it comes to determining whether an individual meets the requirements for
civil commitment." (quoting In re Interest of P.F., 712 N.W.2d 610, 617 (N.D. 2006) (Kapsner, J., concurring))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); In re M.D., 757 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 2008) (declining to find that low
actuarial scores were dispositive); State v. Garner, No. 89840, 2008 Ohio App. Lexis 1663, at 43-46 (Apr. 24,
2008) (holding that actuarial assessment can not be only factor considered in SVP status as Ohio law requires an
individualized determination of risk); State v. Vanek, No. 89125, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5433, at 12 (Nov. 21,
2007) (finding that "utility" of STATIC-99 to individual risk assessment is "open to question"); State v.
McKinniss, 795 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (noting that experts argued "all psychological evaluations
should generally be reviewed in light of the entirety of evidence"); People v. Murphy, No. H021758, 2001 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2770, at 19-20 (Nov. 21, 2001) (holding trial court was justified in relying on experts'
opinion that actuarial tools do not take into account all relevant factors for predicting recidivism).
n363. E.g., In re Interest of J.R., 762 N.W.2d 305, 326 (Neb. 2009) (affirming sexual-predator classification,
despite actuarial score of zero by state expert, based on presence of other risk factors).
n364. State v. Johns, No. 03 MA 61, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4673, at 2-3 (Sept. 20, 2004). Contra
Commonwealth v. Monroe, No. BRCV08-00895, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 480, at 14-15, 22-24 (Dec. 26, 2008)
(ruling in favor of defendant where state's expert conceded score of zero on STATIC-99 and finding expert's
clinical assessment that defendant was likely to recidivate was unsupported by objective evidence).
n365. See, e.g., Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 660 (Cal. 2002) (noting state expert's concession
that STATIC-99 is "only moderately reliable as an overall instrument," but is "best we can come up with," and
defense expert's testimony that STATIC-99 is "weak and inexact," with no known base rate of recidivism,
overlapping predictors that might overestimate risk, and lack of standardization for Hispanic population (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Det. of Traynoff, 831 N.E.2d 709, 714-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing state expert
testimony that STATIC-99 is "work in progress but strongly relied upon" and defense expert's testimony that
actuarial tools are controversial within mental health field and best understood, not as tests with manuals, but as
research instruments (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Taylor, 830 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (citing state expert's comment that RRASOR and STATIC-99 are "reliable tools," and defense expert's
comment that these tools are "young pioneering efforts of novel science" that have "not been accepted by the
psychological or psychiatric community" (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see People v. Therrian, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 415, 418 (Ct. App. 2003) (illustrating agreement between state and defense experts, with state expert
testifying that STATIC-99's developer "never said it was perfect," and defense expert calling test
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"work-in-progress" with unknown reliability).
n366. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the frequent testimony from state
experts that actuarial tools underestimate risk. See also United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp.2d 224, 238-39 (D.
Mass. 2009) (indicating disagreement on STATIC-99's risk estimation whereby state expert concluded age was
not protective factor to warrant belief that tool overestimated defendant's risk while defense expert reached
opposite conclusion).
n367. People v. Thomas, No. C035786, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at 8 (Dec. 13, 2002).
n368. See People v. Avila, No. B193902, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6125, at 23 (July 28, 2008) (noting
defense expert's testimony that STATIC-99 "is based on old cases from outside of the United States"); People v.
Rose, No. H030534, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10017, at 14-15 (Dec. 12, 2007) (noting defense expert's
testimony that STATIC-99 is mostly based on young adult samples of child molesters in England and Canada);
Thomas, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS, at 8 (stating defense expert testified that actuarial tools provide group
data not individual assessments, and that STATIC-99 is based on highly disturbed group, so should be used
cautiously).
n369. See People v. Hernan, No. B199439, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7697, at 7-8 (Sept. 30, 2008)
(citing defense expert's testimony that STATIC-99 is based on data from Canada and England, where sexual
recidivism is three to four times higher than in United States).
n370. See, e.g., State v. Fowler, 694 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that defense expert had
disputed actuarial scores could be used to predict recidivism).
n371. E.g., People v. Marentez, No. B206971, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8001, at 17 (Oct. 6, 2010);
People v. Edmonton, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 839 (Ct. App. 2002); People v. Vercolio, 843 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006).
n372. E.g., In re Commitment of Sandry, 857 N.E.2d 295, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); In re Commitment of
Stevens, 803 N.E.2d 1036, 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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n373. For examples of subpopulations to which defendants belonged, see Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d
654, 660 (Cal. 2002) (Hispanics); People v. Flores, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 2006) (castrated men);
People v. Jackson, No. A10091, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2390, at 11-12 (Mar. 16, 2004) (African
Americans); People v. Wolfenbaerger, No. C043071, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9850, at 12 (Oct. 21, 2003)
(California state population).
n374. Pritchett v. Hunter, No. C 05-0764, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106899, at 12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
n375. Defendants have not successfully challenged the actuarial instruments as irrelevant due to their basis
in group data rather than individual risk. See, e.g., In re care and treatment of Murrell, 215 S.W.3d 96, 112 (Mo.
2007) (en banc) (rejecting irrelevance argument because data is reasonably relied upon by experts in field).
However, courts do acknowledge that actuarial scores cannot predict a given individual's future conduct. See,
e.g., State v. Garner, No. 89840, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1663, at 20 n.16 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2008) (citing
precedent that STATIC-99 cannot provide individualized prediction of future offenses).
n376. People v. Hubbart, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 498 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added).
n377. In re Det. of Taylor, 134 P.3d 254, 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); see also Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 11
(referring to expert claiming actuarial tool was "relevant to the risk of recidivism for the individual as well as the
test group"); People v. Suarez, No. E042936, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9144, at 5 (Oct. 28, 2008)
(describing STATIC-99 as measuring "likelihood a person will engage in sexually violent behavior"); People v.
Troglin, No. H027162, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9649, at 3 (Oct. 24, 2005) (describing STATIC-99 as
"actuarial tool that estimates an individual's risk for sexual reoffense"); People v. Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415,
417 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The total score of the [STATIC-99] is a percentage chance of the defendant's likelihood of
being convicted for a future sexual offense.").
n378. In re Commitment of Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (describing prior trial
court proceedings at Frye hearing to determine admissibility of testimony on actuarial tools' results).
n379. See Helm v. Ahlin, No. 1:08-CV-01648, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41572, at 7 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2009)
(summarizing state expert's testimony that STATIC-99 "score indicates [defendant] has "high risk' of
reoffending" (alteration in original)); Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 659 (Cal. 2002) ("Score of 6 on the
[STATIC-99] test put[s defendant] in the "high risk' category for reoffense, with a 52 percent minimum risk of
reoffense within 15 years."); People v. Zinlu, No. A114563, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8730, at 5 (Oct. 29,
2007) (relaying expert's testimony that STATIC-99 score indicated defendant "had a 39 percent risk of reoffense
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in five years"); People v. Tribble, No. F043573, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10133, at 5 (Nov. 5, 2004)
(describing expert testimony that STATIC-99 score indicated defendant had "38 percent probability of
reconviction over the next 10 years"); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 226 (Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting expert as testifying that, based on actuarial tools, defendant ""comes out over [a] 50 percent' risk of
reoffending" (alteration in original)); see also Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 417 (describing STATIC-99 total
score as being "percentage chance of the defendant's likelihood of being convicted for a future sexual offense").
n380. State v. P.H., 874 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
n381. People v. Taylor, 830 N.E.2d 855, 857-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
n382. See People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 688 n.23, 689 (Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that defendant
was not diagnosed properly but relying on expert's belief that defendant would reoffend).
n383. Harris et al., supra note 170, at 71 ("The recidivism estimates provided by the STATIC-99 are group
estimates based upon reconvictions and were derived from groups of individuals with these characteristics. As
such, these estimates do not directly correspond to the recidivism risk of an individual offender.").
n384. See In re Civil Commitment of K.S., No. A-1451-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. LEXIS 627, at 6-9 (Mar. 11,
2008) (noting "high risk" score on STATIC-99 as part of determination that commitment was proper); State v.
Vanek, No. 89125, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5433, at 6-7 (Nov. 21, 2007) (finding for state despite low score
while noting that "the utility of the Static-99 evaluation as a diagnostic tool for individual risk assessment is
open to question" (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Ellison, No. 78256, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4216,
at 5-6, 24 (Aug. 8, 2002) (ruling that court need not give much weight to STATIC-99 evidence showing
defendant to be "low-to-medium risk," since actuarial-based risk estimates could "be at odds with Ohio's
statutory scheme" requiring individualized determinations).
n385. See In re Commitment of Field, 813 N.E.2d 319, 322-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The expert stated that he
used the Hanson & Bussiere meta-analysis, which he described as itself an actuarial instrument, and concluded
that the defendant's future dangerousness was indicated by having seven of the twenty-two identified correlates
in the meta-analysis. Id. However, the meta-analysis he cited was not intended as an instrument and, indeed, the
authors themselves describe the work as "a quantitative review of the sexual offender recidivism literature." R.
Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism
Studies, 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 348, 349 (1998). While Hanson and Bussiere discuss the various
(far more than twenty-two) correlates with sexual recidivism, they "do not recommend simply summing the
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items." Id. at 358.
n386. In re Commitment of Sandry, 857 N.E.2d 295, 300, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); see also B.W. v. State,
909 N.E.2d 471, 474-75 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding registration requirement with expert basing risk
assessment of juvenile in part on STATIC-99).
n387. Sandry, 857 N.E.2d at 297-98, 316.
n388. In re Anderson, 730 N.W.2d 570, 582 (N.D. 2007).
n389. In re Commitment of Stevens, 803 N.E.2d 1036, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Commitment of
Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (attributing such categorization to
STATIC-99's creators).
n390. In re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
n391. Harris et al., supra note 170, at 3. In addition to using language that is more severe than that provided
by STATIC-99 Coding Rules, courts have also miscategorized defendants altogether. In one case, the expert
stated that the STATIC-99 score of four placed the defendant in the "high risk" category, despite STATIC-99's
classification of four as "medium-high." In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2005).
n392. People v. Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 417 (Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
n393. Experts have represented the development process for different actuarial tests in widely divergent
manners. See Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 108-09 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (recounting expert's testimony that
STATIC-99 was "developed by looking at the characteristics of approximately 4,000 sex offenders to see which
characteristics they possessed were associated with the likelihood or reoffense within 15 years, as defined by
reconviction"); People v. Flores, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating that STATIC-99 is "based on
data from over 31,000 sex offenders"); People v. Torres, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597, 600 n.4 (Ct. App. 2002)
(indicating that expert distinguished RRASOR and STATIC-99 by declaring that RRASOR was not developed
using actual recidivism statistics, but STATIC-99 was); Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1187 (discussing expert
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testimony and stating STATIC-99 is "based upon a study of thousands of sex offenders from England, Canada,
and the United States"); see also United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) (relying on
expert's testimony that RRASOR's five-year rate of 49.8% was observed rate, while ten-year rate was
extrapolated).
n394. See Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 659 (Cal. 2002) (stating expert testified that a factor of
STATIC-99 was "whether the most recent sex offense involved the use of violence"); People v. Elam, No.
C039689, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5621, at 8 (June 10, 2003) (stating expert testified that defendant's
score was "6 out of 6" on STATIC-99); see also In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (relating expert testimony that STATIC-99 includes substance abuse as factor).
n395. See Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 417 (indicating that STATIC-99's experience table is based on
convictions for new sexual offenses); State v. Hornack, No. 81021, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 415, at 8 (Jan. 30,
2003) (referring to state expert's statement that STATIC-99 experience tables do not include charges).
n396. See Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (describing defense expert's
testimony that she used RRASOR but not STATIC-99 because latter measures risk for criminal offending and
not sexual deviance).
n397. See People v. Allen, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 193 (Cal. 2008) (describing state expert who originally
assigned score of six on STATIC-99, but later raised score to eight after receiving additional information);
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 914, 915 (Va. 2007) (describing state expert who, while initially giving
defendant a RRASOR score of five, testified at probable cause hearing that it should be two, and later adjusted
score to three at trial); Miles v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 330, 334 (Va. 2006) (finding state conceded
defendant incorrectly received RRASOR score of four, an additional point that was not warranted by number of
prior convictions, resulting in defendant's release from civil commitment as statute specifically required
minimum RRASOR score before initiating proceedings); People v. Clotfelter, No. C038351, 2002 Cal App.
Unpub. LEXIS 8921, at 24-25 (Sept. 25, 2002) (noting that, although state expert had previously scored
defendant with a three on STATIC-99, she later realized while preparing for trial that she could have added two
more points due to evidence of prior sex offenses, thus increasing recidivism risk from thirteen to forty percent);
In re Commitment of J.P., 772 A.2d 54, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (referring to state expert who
admitted scoring STATIC-99 incorrectly by double counting offense).
n398. See United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (D. Haw. 2008) (discussing two point gap
in state and defense experts' STATIC-99 scores and one point gap in RRASOR scores).
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n399. See People v. Stewart, No. C037873, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4207, at 6-7 (Apr. 29, 2003)
(noting that different state experts gave RRASOR scores of three and five and STATIC-99 scores of six and
seven to same defendant); Therrian, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 417 (explaining that two state experts gave defendant
different scores using STATIC-99); Clotfelter, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8921, at 24-25, 28-29 (noting
states experts' disagreement on which offense to classify as "index offense"); In re Commitment of Combs, 720
N.W.2d 684, 687, 689 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (identifying situation where four state experts gave same defendant
RRASOR scores of two, three, and four; and STATIC-99 scores from four to eight, with one expert giving a "six
slash seven slash eight" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d
1184, 1188 (Ill. 2004) (observing that one state expert scored defendant "a little bit higher" than other state
expert (internal quotation marks omitted)).
n400. No. B206734, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1427 (Feb. 23, 2009).
n401. Calderon, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1427, at 14.
n402. E.g., People v. Paredes, No. B200935, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 3274, at 3 (Apr. 28, 2009); People v.
Lopez, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 549, 553 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Edmonton, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 838-39 (Ct. App.
2002).
n403. See Barbaree et al., supra note 220, at 500 (noting that the ten items measured by STATIC-99 include
the four used in RRASOR); Harris et al., supra note 170, at 3 (noting that STATIC-99 was created by merging
RRASOR and another tool).
n404. Michael C. Seto, Is More Better? Combining Actuarial Risk Scales to Predict Recidivism Among
Adult Sex Offenders, 17 Psychol. Assessment 156, 156 (2005); see also Hanson, supra note 158, at 2-4
(describing statistical studies that RRASOR relied upon in developing guidelines for actuarial factors).
n405. Seto, supra note 404, at 165.
n406. Howard E. Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Risk Measures Produce Different Risk Rankings for
Sexual Offenders, 18 Sexual Abuse 423, 431 (2006).
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n407. See, e.g., Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DMC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71127, at 43-45 (D.N.J.
Sept. 3, 2008) (finding plaintiff's argument "nothing more than Monday-morning quarter-backing" because
based on difference of opinion over actuarial tools' reliability); People v. Langhorne, No. H027495, 2005 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11150, at 48 (Dec. 1, 2005).
n408. See Fennel, supra note 58, at 61 (calling STATIC-99 unreliable and saying that laws relying on
actuarial tools ask science to "perform a task it cannot reliably perform").
n409. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History of Expert
Evidence, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 763, 793 (2007) (capitalization omitted).
n410. See D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary Between Science
and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 679, 683 (2007) (describing
"heroic positivist" view that "when properly applied, [science] allows a practitioner to discover new details of
the contours of ... external reality").
n411. See George, supra note 119, at 252 (arguing that this places opposing attorney in position of either
having to challenge admissibility of expert's opinion based on reliability grounds or submit her own expert and
then challenge weight of evidence offered by original expert).
n412. See infra Part II for a discussion of the "moral panic" that has given rise to current SVP laws.
n413. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 40, at 1445-46 (arguing for widespread use of actuarial risk
assessment despite uncertainty and other concerns surrounding their accuracy and impact). But see In re
Commitment of Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring)
(referring to high rate of "false positives" from actuarial tests and arguing that with regard to sexual predators,
"we have embarked on the first steps into a new world, arguably a science fiction world, in which judges and
juries are asked to prevent crimes years before they occur" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
n414. Cf. Boer, supra note 246, at 1 (arguing that there is more concern in literature about which method of
risk assessment is preferred than ethics of, and whether public safety is actually served by, mental health
attempts at risk assessment); Janus, supra note 3, at 6-7 (maintaining that actuarial assessment debate improperly
focuses on small number of sex offenders who are at risk of being predators instead of focusing on larger
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patterns of sexual violence and more prevalent non-predator sex crimes, like acquaintance rape).
n415. See Nathan James et al., Civil Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons 32-35 (2008) (describing
several states' experiments with outpatient civil commitment and other innovative monitoring programs); Molly
T. Geissenhainer, The $ 62 Million Question: Is Virginia's New Center to House Sexually Violent Predators
Money Well Spent?, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1301, 1328-35 (2008) (discussing Virginia's civil commitment program
and possible therapeutic alternatives); Lester, supra note 11, at 372-73 (arguing that residential and employment
restrictions placed on sex offenders after punishment for their crimes are unjust and should be replaced by
rehabilitation programs).
n416. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 40, at 1459 (contending that legislatures will continue to mandate
risk assessments in sexual predator laws and judges will "undoubtedly continue to oblige").
n417. See Alan D. Gold, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law: The Scientific Approach 17 (2003) (contending
that frequency of junk science being offered as credible in criminal cases means that judges and lawyers must
gain scientific literacy to distinguish good science from bad).
n418. Post-Daubert, others have written general guides to educate judges and lawyers on matters of science
and statistics. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (2d ed. 2000) (including chapters on
statistics and multiple regression); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 241, at 155-67 (explaining science and
error rate behind predictions of sexual offenders' dangerousness). Another paper offers specific questions for
ascertaining the level of expertise the offered expert has in the subject at issue. David M. Godden & Douglas
Walton, Argument from Expert Opinion as Legal Evidence: Critical Questions and Admissibility Criteria of
Expert Testimony in the American Legal System, 19 Ratio Juris 261, 277-79 (2006).
Page 79
83 Temp. L. Rev. 697, *756
